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1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The purpose of this article is to examine some of the problems
that arise when a statute of limitations is asserted in a case involving
multi-national, multi-state, or multi-legal system elements. Recent
cases will be stressed. Some emphasis will be placed on North Caro-
lina authority and an effort made to compare general law and North
Carolina law in this area of conflict of laws.
.t Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina School of Law. This
articl6 was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Centet.
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Limitation of action-conflicts issues arose at least as early as the
Eighteenth Century. In 1797, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held that the state statute of limitations ran even though at all times
"the defendant was beyond sea."' This case also announced two
fundamental principles: that to be applied a statute of limitations
must be pleaded,2 and that the forum will apply its own statute of limi-
tations to determine whether relief is barred. The conflicts issue was
there presented .absent modem complications of borrowing, tolling, or
long arm statutes.
An even earlier North Carolina case thus stated the basic philoso-
phy of legislators regarding statutes of limitations, and the normal judi-
cial reaction thereto:
1. If the defendant was in this country when the contract was made, and the
act began to run against the plaintiff, it will run on notwithstanding the
defendant's removal; or if it had not began [sic] to run before his removal,
his absence will not suspend its operation; or if he resided beyond sea at the
time of the contract, and the plaintiff will make use of the remedies offered
by our courts, he must accept of them upon the terms imposed by our law;
that is to say, he must bring his suit within three years. . . . [AIll con-
tracts, wherever made, are subject to be affected by the lapse of time in every
country ....
Anonymous, 2 N.C..459,- 459-60 (1797).
2. For a modem dress affirmation in an airplane crash situation, see Strauss
v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152 (2d Cir. 1968). "Mhe Statute of Limita-
tions is an affirmative or so-called 'personal privilege' defense which may be waived
if not promptly pleaded. . . . In sum, the party wishing to raise the defense is obliged
to plead the Statute of Limitations at the earliest possible moment." Id. at 1155;
accord, Hodgson v. Humphries; 454 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1972); Calloway v. Ford
Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 189 S.E.2d 484 (1972). Teague v. Asheboro Motor Co.,
14 N.C. App. 736, 189 S.E.2d 671 (1972) holds: 'The defense of the statute of
limitations was properly raised by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for
relief." As to questions of the burden of proof, see 2 STANsBuRY's NORTH CAROLINA
EviDENcE § 208, 148 n.76 (Brandis rev. 1973), which states:
[U]nder the pre-Rule practice, the defendant was required to plead the stat-
ute of limitations as a defense, and could not raise it by demurrer; but once
it was pleaded, the burden of proof on the issue was on the plaintiff ...
Under the Rules, it may be raised by motion to dismiss when appearing on
the face of the complaint--see Rule 9(f)-but is otherwise to be pleaded,
being specifically labeled an affirmative defense by Rule 8(c) ....
but noted that "[in a non-jury case, the Court of Appeals . . . held, without citation
of the Rule or other authority, that the defendant has the burden of proof on the
issue. Airport Knitting, Inc. v. Yam Co., Inc., 11 N.C. App. 162, 180 S.E.2d
611 (1971)."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that once properly asserted by
the defendant, plaintiff has the burden of proof to take the case out of the statute
of limitations. Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966); Powers
v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E.2d 431 (1941); Employers
Commercial Union Co. of America v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 15 N.C. App. 406,
190 S.E.2d 364 (1972); accord, Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338
(Sth Cir. 1971).
In Hodges v.'Johnson, 18- N.C. App. 40, 195 S.E.2d 579 (1973), where the
trial court had dsmissed the case on the ground that the statute of limitations had
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The act of limitations was made to prevent the inconvenience of
stale demands, and to hinder them after a reasonable length of
time from rising up to charge him [the defendant]. This law
though very generally reprobated, is founded upon principles of
justice, and ought to be adhered to...3
However, in that case the court held that a testamentary direction to
pay "all my just debts" precluded an executor from successfully plead-
ing the statute to a time-barred claim against the estate and allowed
recovery.4  As will subsequently appear, judicial liberality in re-
fraining from applying statutes of limitations continues today, often
with a high degree of sophistication.
An 1801 case held that the provision of the 1715 Act of Assem-
bly of North Carolina, which barred claims of creditors made more
than seven years after the death of the debtor, was applicable to a suit
brought by the British executor of the creditor. Plaintiffs contention
that the 1715 statute did not apply to British creditors was rejected in
these words: "[l]t is a general law. . . and I cannot see any reason
why it ought to lose any of its force. . . when pleaded against a Brit-
ish creditor. .... I
It would be only of academic interest to trace in North Carolina,
or elsewhere, the evolutionary development of legislative thinking and
the progressively sophisticated statutes of limitations resulting there-
from. It is most important in any given conflicts situation involving
limitations to keep in mind that specific statutes are involved and that
the precise statutory language, and its judicial construction, will nor-
mally be determinative of the issue. There is substantial periodical lit-
erature dealing with statute of limitations-conflicts problems in gen-
run, but failed to make a finding as to when the cause of action accrued, a new trial
was granted.
In federal diversity cases, "[tihe defense of the statute of limitations may be raised
by motion for summary judgment, motion to dismiss, or by motion for judgment on
the pleadings," as well as by answer. Ericksen v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 342 F. Supp.
1190, 1194 (D. Minn. 1972).
3. Anonymous, 2 N.C. 243 (1795) (per curiam).
4. Id.
5. Miller's Ex'trx v. Gordon's Ex'r, 1 N.C. 218 (1801). However, a later case
decided by the Circuit Court of the United States in 1802 held that the act of 1715
was suspended from operation by the acts of 1777 disqualifying British adherents to
sue in North Carolina courts, which suspension continued in force until the treaty of
peace of 1783 was made effective in North Carolina by the federal act of 1787. Og-
den v. Witherspoon, 18 F. Cas. 619 (No. 10,461) (C.C.D.N.C. 1802); accord,
In re Lewis, 3 N.C. 346 (1805) (In some reprint copies of 3 N.C. page 346 is
omitted).
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eral.6 In this study an effort is made first to determine the statute of
limitations applicable, respectively, in state, federal question and diver-
sity cases, and to examine the rules as to which statute controls where
there is, or may be, state and federal conflicts or conflicts in diversity.
The second objective is to consider conflicts arising between the limi-
tation statutes of the forum and those of another jurisdiction, hopefully
in progressive order of their complexity. A single case frequently pre-
sents a cluster of conflicts questions making separate logical presen-
tation of issues difficult.
2. LE x FoRi DETERMINES LIMITATION OF ACTION
The fundamental rule is that each jurisdiction may adopt its own
statute of limitations and apply it to all litigation in its courts.7
North Carolina gave early recognition to this principal in Haws v.
Cragie8 where suit was brought on a bond executed in Virginia more
than ten but less'than twenty years after it became due. Holding the
North Carolina presumption of payment in ten years barred the action
even though in Virginia the common law presumption of payment
did not arise until twenty years had elapsed, the court quoted with
approval section 576 of Story's Conflicts which said:
In regard to statutes of limitation, or prescription, there is no doubt
that they are strictly questions affecting the remedy, and not
questions upon the merits. . . . The object of them is to fix cer-
tain periods within which all suits shall be brought. . . by sub-
jects, or by foreigners. And there can be no reason, no sound
policy, in allowing higher or more extensive privileges to for-
eigners, than to subjects . . . [T]his rule is equally as well recog-
nized in foreign jurisprudence, as it is in the common law.9
6. Representative articles are: Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of
Laws, 31 MICH. L. Rav. 474 (1933); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limita-
tions, 63 I-nv. L. REv. 1177, 1260-69 (1950); Comment, The Statute of Limitations
and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE LJ. 492 (1919). Others treating specific issues
are cited later.
7. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
rnhe time after which suits or actions shall be barred, has been, from a re-
mote antiquity, fixed by every nation, in virtue of that sovereignty by which
it exercises its legislation for all persons and property within its jurisdiction.
... It being settled' that the statute of limitations may bar recoveries
upon foreign judgments; that the effect intended to be given under our Con-
stitution to judgments, is, that they are conclusive only as regards the merits;
the common law principle then applies to suits upon them, that they must be
brought within the period prescribed by local law, the lex fori, or the suit
will be barred.
Id. at 327-28; accord, Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) (suit
on foreign wrongful death statute).
8. 49 N.C. 394 (1857) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 395-97. Nonce v. Richmond & D.R.R., 33 F. 429, 435 (C.C.
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The lex fori limitation has been applied to permit a North Caro-
lina suit on a note under seal executed and delivered in New York
and there barred.10 Where the North Carolina statute had run, it
was held, in diversity, to bar a suit between nonresidents in a federal
district court in North Carolina for breach of an employment con-
tract executed in Switzerland and to be performed in New York with-
out references to limitations periods in Switzerland or New York. 1 And
it was applied to uphold jurisdiction in a diversity case brought in Ver-
mont by a North Carolina plaintiff against a Vermont defendant for in-
juries resulting from an automobile accident in Connecticut where the
cause was time barred in Connecticut but not in Vermont.' 2
The general rule is succinctly stated in the Restatement in these
words:
(1) An action will not be maintained if it is barred by the stat-
ute of limitations of the forum...
(2) An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the stat-
ute of limitations of the forum, even though it would be barred
by the statute of limitations of another state, except .... 13
The lex fori rule applies to a state when it enters the courts of
another state as a plaintiff.' 4 In a suit by Michigan to recover for the
cost of care for an epileptic daughter against the estate of a parent, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held it was time barred by the Arizona stat-
ute, saying:
[O]nce a state, as such, goes beyond its territorial limits, and
seeks redress in the courts of a sister state, its mantle of sovereignty
drops at its borders, and it enters the courts of another state
clothed only in the common garb of an ordinary person ...
Michigan's cause of action is controlled by the applicable Arizona
statute of limitations.' 5
Thus far we have assumed that the forum statute of limitations
contains no borrowing provision.' 6 Though now somewhat rare, such
W.D.N.C. 1887), after an extensive examination of the issue, concludes: "Tihe
merits of the cause of action are determined by the laws of the place where it arose;
but the mode of procedure and remedy, including statutes of limitation, are solely regu-
lated by the laws of the place where the action is brought."
10. Sayer v. Henderson, 225 N.C. 642, 35 S.E.2d 875 (1945).
11. Grombach v. Oerlikon Tool & Arms Corp. of America, 276 F.2d 155 (4th
Cir. 1960).
12. Earnhardt v. Shattuck, 232 F. Supp. 845 (D. Vt. 1964).
13. R1STATEMENT (SECoND) OF CoNFrucr oF LAws § 142 (1971).
14. Michigan v. First Nat'l Bank, 17 Ariz. App. 45; 495 P.2d 485 (1972).
15. Id. at 49, 495 P.2d at 489.
16. The effect of borrowing statutes is considered in text accompanying notes
144-200 infra.
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situations still- do arise. This was pointed up in a suit brought under the
Clayton Act in a federal district court in New Jersey by plaintiff stock-
holders against Delaware and New York corporations for alleged vio-
lations in Illinois.17  In enforcing the then applicable New Jersey statute
of limitations the court stated:
New Jersey has not enacted a so-called "borrowing statute", i.e.,
a law directing that the statute of limitations of the state in which
a cause of action arose shall be applied to bar a suit on such
cause of action if brought in New Jersey. New Jersey has thus not
departed from the settled common law rule of conflict of laws that
the forum applies only its own procedural statute of limitations and
does not give effect to a statute of another state in which the
cause of action arose .... 18
The effect of borrowing statutes will be considered in another sec-
tion. 19
3. LIMITATIONS IN DrVERSITY CASES
Diversity cases in federal courts afford a special application of
the rule that the forum will apply the statute of limitations of the juris-
diction in which it sits. The general diversity rule is stated in Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York:20 the outcome of a case heard by a federal
court sitting in diversity should be no different from what the outcome
would have been had the case been heard in the forum state court.
The Supreme Court has applied the same rule in an equity case in
the federal court. 21 The same rule prevails as to the limitation ap-
plicable to diversity actions at law.22  In fact, under the Federal Judi-
17. Gordon v. Loew's Inc., 247 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1957).
18. Id. at 454. Apparently New Jersey continues to have no borrowing statute.
19. See text accompanying notes 144-200 infra.
20. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a State-created right solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only
another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is
made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement
of the right as given by the State.
3 . . In essence the intent of that decision [Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the
parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan-
tially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court. . . . [MAe have
held that in diversity cases the federal courts must follow the law of the
State . . . as to conflict of laws, Klaxon v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487.
Id. at 108-10. Erie applies to suits in equity as well as actions at law. Ruhlin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
21. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
22. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 932 (1971); accord, Player Pianette, Inc. v. Dale Electronics, Inc., 487 F.2d
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ciary Act of 1789,23 federal courts, in enforcing state created rights,
whether legal24 or equitable, 25 regularly applied state limitation stat-
utes long before the compulsion of Erie. State law was also used to
determine time of accrual2 6 and tolling effects. Current rules as to
these two problems will be separately discussed.
Two 1971 diversity cases in Florida, with rather spectacular
facts, applied the Florida statute of limitations. In one the plaintiff
purchased a new Lincoln-Continental from a Ford dealer in New Jer-
sey in November 1965. While driving to Florida gasoline odors in the
passenger compartment nauseated the plaintiff, and she returned the
car to the dealer in February 1966. A products liability suit was filed
in January 1969 more than three but less than four years after plain-
tiff first experienced the odor. Defendant contended the Florida three
year statute for "an action upon a contract"28 applied; plaintiff, that
the Florida four year statute applicable to actions "not specifically pro-
vided for" applied.2 9 Florida courts had not decided the point, and
the federal district judge held the three year statute applicable. Pend-
ing appellate decision in the diversity case, the Supreme Court of Flor-
336 (8th Cir. 1973); National Family Ins. Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 474 F.2d 237
(7th Cir. 1973); Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 914 (1967); Jones v. Bankers Life Co., 131 F.2d 989 (4th
Cir. 1942); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see Rios
v. Drennan, 209 F. Supp. 927, 930 (E.D.N.C. 1962) ("The North Carolina rule
is that an action is not commenced until summons issues, hence this action was not
timely begun and is barred by the statute of limitations. ). N.C.R. Civ. P.
3 now provides:
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The clerk
shall enter the date of filing on the original complaint, and such entry shall
be prima facie evidence of the date of filing. A civil action may also be
commenced by the issuance of a summons when . . . a person.. . request[s]
permission to file his complaint within 20 days and... the court .. grant[s]
the requested permission.
Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1972) holds:
Pennsylvania substantive law is controlling. . . . The District Court [sitting
in Ohio] . . . correctly conclud[ed] that in this diversity case Ohio conflict of
laws rules govern . . .
[Q]uestions relating to the form of action, i.e., the remedy, are pro-
cedural and are to be determined by the law of the forum . ... In an
action in the United States District Court in Ohio, the procedural law of
Ohio must be applied in determining whether the cause of action sounds in
tort or contract, and in deciding what is the appropriate statute of limitations.
23. Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
24. See Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 (1893); Nonce v. Richmond &
D.R.R., 33 F. 429, 436 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1887).
25. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923).
26. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. City of Blackwell, 87 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1936).
27. Van Dyke v. Parker, 83 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1936).
28. FiA. SAT. ANN. § 95.11(5)(e) (1960).
29. Id. § 95.11(4) (1960). This section provides "for- relief not specifically pro.
vided for in this [limitation] chapter."
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ida in another case approved a state court decision that in these cir-
cumstances the four year limitation was controlling80 The federal
circuit court reversed, 3' remarking, "the District Court . divination
of Florida law turned out to be wrong.""2
The other Florida diversity case"3 was brought by the widow
of astronaut Grissom under the Florida wrongful death statute for his
demise while ground testing an Apollo space capsule manufactured by
defendant, North American Aviation. The death occurred in January
1967. The suit was filed in the state court in January 1971 and
promptly removed to the federal court. Defendant asserted the Flor-
ida two year wrongful death limitation, 4 while plaintiff contended for
the special twelve year limitation against professional engineers (in-
cluding corporations) in actions "arising out of any deficiency in de-
sign or planning or for any deficiency in the design or planning of
an improvement to real property [sic]. . .. ,,35 In the absence of
state authority the federal district court dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he only correct interpretation is that a professional en-
gineer or architect is susceptible to suit for a period of only
twelve (12) years, and that a plaintiff, once death occurs, has
not more than two (2) years in which to bring suit or have the
action barred."8
Diversity questions are further complicated when a case is transferred
from one district court to another, as is permissible under Federal
law.37 When this happens the Supreme Court has said:
[T]he transferee district court must be obligated to apply
the state law that would have been applied if there had been no
change of venue.
...We do not attempt to determine whether. . . the same
considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under
§ 1404(a) .... 38
30. Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 239 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1970).
31. Eastburn v. Ford Motor Co., 438 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. Id. at 126.
33. Grissom v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(6) (1960), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(6)
(Supp. V1I, 1972).
35. Id. § 95.11(10) (Supp. VII, 1972).
36. 326 F. Supp. at 468.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970) provides: "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."38. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639-40 (1964) (emphasis added).
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It has been held that where the parties "almost" stipulated the
transfer that was made and where the tolling provisions of the stat-
utes of the two states conflicted, that of the transferor state controls.
3 9
However, where a plaintiff obtained transfer, from a federal court in
Georgia to one in Kentucky, of an action barred by the Kentucky
statute of limitations at the time it was filed in the federal court in
Georgia, the Kentucky statute was applied and the case dismissed by
the transferee court.4"
No general analysis is here made of what "procedural" elements
of state law, as distinguished from state "substantive" law, are obliga-
tory upon federal courts in diversity under the rules laid down in Erie
and Klaxon. Diversity cases bearing expressly upon statute of limita-
tions conflicts problems will be examined in subsequent sections of this
article together with pertinent state decisions.41
4. LIMITAnoNs IN FEDERAL QUESTION CASES
The United States as a party plaintiff is not subject to a state
statute of limitations unless it expressly consents thereto.4" However,
if the state limitation statute creates as an absolute prerequisite to the
accrual of a cause of action that a suit must be filed within a
specified time, the United States is bound thereby.43 Moreover, by
39. Bott v. American Hydrocarbon Corp., 441 F.2d 896, 899 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971).
Railing v. UMW, 276 F. Supp. 238 (N.D.W. Va. 1967) holds that in the absence
of a controlling federal statute 'of limitations the federal court will apply the borrowing
provisions of the statute of limitations of the state in which the federal action was
originally brought despite the transfer, upon the motion of the defendant, to a federal
court sitting in another state.
40. Carson v. U-Haul Co., 434 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1970); see Les Schwimley
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Cal. 1967) and note
thereon in 56 GEo. L.L 1004 (1968).
41. For a general discussion of the obligations imposed on federal courts in di-
versity cases by Guaranty Trust Co. see Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 536
(4th Cir. 1970).
42. United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301 (1960);
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940); Mason v. United States, 461 F.2d
1364 (Ct. Cl. 1972); United States v. Firmbaber, 337 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Wis.
1971).
43. United States v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 17 (9th Cir.
1972). In affirming a summary judgment for the defendant company, the court said:
Mhe government must have become entitled to a claim and have ac-
quired a cause of action before it comes under the umbrella of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415.
Under the clear language of the California statute and California cases
construing it an insured under the uninsured motorist coverage here in-
volved has acquired no right to sue the insurance carrier until compliance
with Section 11580.2 has been accomplished [by filing suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction within one year of the accident]. Summerlin cannot
19 741.
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1966 legislation Congress has imposed limitations upon the time in
which the United States may bring actions as a party plaintiff."
Where a federally given right is involved, Congress may, of
course, prescribe an applicable statute of limitations. Where this has
been done the supremacy clause of the Constitution applies, and the
federal limitation is conclusive. This is true even in the case of the
Federal Torts Claim Act which directs that the existence of a substan-
tive cause of action against the Government is to be determined by the
law of the state in which the act occurs, 45 but which also expressly
provides a federal period of limitation.4"
be stretched to create a right in the government to sue under state law
without complying with the condition precedent to the accrual of the action.
Id. at 19.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1970), in great detail, essentially limits the government
as a plaintiff to three years for tort actions and six years for contract actions. Sec-
tion 2416 contains tolling provisions.
As to causes of action in favor of the United States existing when the Act was
passed, it was said in United States v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 743, 746
(E.D. Va. 1973), that the Act expressly provides that: "any cause of action in fa-
vor of the United States existing at the date of the Act's passage will be deemed to
have accrued on that date .... "
A unique twist in the criminal law area is contained in Lucia v. United States,
474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973). In a nine to five en banc decision the court said:
We hold that the period of limitations for the assessment of wagering
excise taxes does not commence to run until a return has been filed, even
though to require a return would violate the taxpayer's constitutional right
against self-incrimination. No return having been filed by Lucia for the
period involved, the statute of limitations [three years after the tax return is
filed] does not bar the assessment.
Id. at 572-73. Whether the Supreme Court will review and affirm this decision re-
mains to be seen.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970) imposes liability for:
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970) provides: "A tort claim against the United
States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Fed-
eral agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within
six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final
denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented." In Rygg v. United
States, 334 F. Supp. 219,.221 (D.N.D. 1971), the court said of this statute: "This
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action not filed within the time prescribed
and this limitation is one not capable of waiver nor subject to an estoppel." See Amer-
ican Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 453 F.2d 1380, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Katzer
v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Neher v. United States,
265 F. Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967); Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1464 (1952). See also
Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d. 732 (1966). Neher held that successive sonic booms generated
by Air Force B-58 planes, which allegedly damaged plaintiff's building, did not constitute
a continuing tort and denied recovery for sonic boom damage occurring more than
two years prior to the commencement of action.
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Representative examples of federal preemption of limitation are
found in the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended by the Portal to Por-
tal Act,47 the lump sum death payment provision of the Social Security
Act,48 the Federal Employers Liability Act,49 the Interstate Commerce
Act,5 the Jones Act, 51 the Death on the High Seas Act,52 the Suits in Ad-
47. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1970); see Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279
(10th Cir. 1972), holding this limitation to be procedural, and hence waived if not
pleaded.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1970) (two years).
49. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970) (three years). However, Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), rev'g 332 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1964), held that
the filing of a state court suit in Ohio on the same cause of action within three years
which was later dismissed for improper venue, which circumstance tolled the running
of the statute in Ohio, also had this effect in the federal court suit promptly filed after
the state dismissal and that the declaration of this rule effectuated the purpose of the
act. Section 56 of the act gives state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over
suits authorized by it.
50. 49 U.S.C. § 16(3)(f) (1970) provides: "A complaint for the enforce-
ment of an order of the commission for the payment of money shall be filed in the
district court or the State court within one year from the date of the order, and not
after." In Aluminum Co. of America v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 337
F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (mem.) the plaintiff had filed, in time, a suit for
reparations against the defendant carrier. Thereafter the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission made an order directing repayment of excessive rates charged. More than a
year after this order plaintiff amended his complaint to a complaint for enforcement.
The court held: "[Pilaintiff's claims for enforcement of the Commission order relate
back to the time it filed its complaints and are not barred by the statute of limita-
tions." Id. at 684.
The holding in Aluminum Co. is consistent with federal preemption under the In-
terstate Commerce Act. However, questions may remain as to which federal statute
of limitations applies when two are in conflict. For example, in a suit by a motor
carrier against the United States to recover for the transportation of household goods
of military personnel, the Court of Claims held the general six year statute of the
Tucker Act applied to claims for the motor shipments in question rather than the three
year statute provided by 49 U.S.C. § 304a(1) (1970) for suits brought under the
Interstate Commerce Act. Global Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 456 F.2d 717 (Ct.
Cl. 1972). Here the plaintiff was both a certified motor carrier under Part H of the
Interstate Commerce Act and an exempt freight forwarder of used household goods
under Part IV of that Act (49 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (2) ).
51. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). In case of injury or death to seamen, the Jones
Act gives the election to maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
jury trial and makes applicable to such actions all the provisions of the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act including the three year limitation period contained in 45
U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921), held that where a stevedore
was killed on a vessel by employer negligence, action may be brought under a state
wrongful death act in a federal admiralty court but must be filed within the time pre-
scribed by the state act. However, in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S.
221 (1958), the Court held that in an action for unseaworthiness, combined with an
action under the Jones Act, a Texas state court could not apply its state two year
limitation period to the unseaworthiness action since it is shorter than the three year
period prescribed by the Jones Act.
Presumably such actions today could be brought in federal court without reference
to any state act and subject only to time limitation for laches. See the discussion
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miralty By or Against Vessels or Cargoes of the United States Act,"8 the
Wrecks and Salvage Act,"4 the Tucker Act,ss and the Military Selective
of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), at text accompanying
notes 63-65 infra.
52. The cause of action given by 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970) is limited by
section 763 which requires the action to be brought within two years or thereafter
within ninety days after the first reasonable opportunity to secure jurisdiction has of-
fered.
53. 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1970) (two years). This limitation is also made ap-
plicable by 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1970) to suits brought against the United States for
damages caused by public vessels or for towage or salvage services (Public Vessels Act,
46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1970)).
54. 46 U.S.C. §§ 721-38 (1970). Suits brought under Chapter 19 of 46
U.S.C. are required by this Act to be brought within two years unless "there had
not been any reasonable opportunity of arresting the assisted or salved vessel within
the jurisdiction of the court ... ." Id. § 730.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1970), in part, states: "Every claim of which the
Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed
within six years after such claim first accrues." Amell v. United States, 384 U.S.
158 (1966), involved cases where the petitioners were employees of various federal
executive departments working aboard government vessels who had filed suit for over-
time pay in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. The Court held that the
Court of Claims properly had jurisdiction rather than the federal district courts under
the Suits in Admiralty Act which contained a two year statute. The Court of Claims
had transferred the cases to the federal district courts. A majority of the Supreme
Court held:
. . . To uphold this transfer would bar those claims which accrued more than
two years prior to the time the actions were filed ...
mhe Tucker Act permits all individuals with contractual claims against
the Government to sue in the Court of Claims. The Suits in Admiralty Act
similarly affords an open berth in the district courts, provided the claims
are of a maritime nature ....
As in other jurisdictional questions involving intersecting statutes, there
is no positive answer.... [We believe the traditional treatment of fed-
eral employees by the Government tips the balance in favor of Court of
Claims jurisdiction.
Id. at 159, 166.
However, the Court of Claims is not always a safe harbor for plaintiffs. In Cason
v. United States, 461 F.2d 784 (Ct. Cl. 1972), an action by a discharged navy man
for military pay, the government asserted the defense of laches, complaining that plain-
tiff waited until the last day of the six year limitation period to bring suit. In granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment the court said:
[Wie have found lack of diligence and resulting prejudice to defendant
in cases where the delay was as little as eleven months ....
Here, plaintiff has offered no explanation for a delay one day short of
six years nor has he sought to show that defendant has not been prejudiced.
Plaintiff's claim accrued immediately upon his discharge. . . . And resort to
a Discharge Review Board is a permissive remedy which does not toll the
statute of limitations. .. . Nor should resort to permissive remedies operate
to toll the running of time in the case of laches.
Mhe doctrine of laches is for application to military pay cases to the
same extent as for civilians.
Id. at 787-88.
In Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n of the Philippines, Inc. V. United States,
373 F.2d 356 (Ct. Cl. 1967), rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 975 (1968), the Court
of Claims applied its six year statute to bar an action for reimbursement for counter-
feit Japanese money allegedly distributed during the war. It held that any right under
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Service Act of 1967.8
A. Admiralty
A number of these preemption acts involve admiralty questions.
The general admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, one of the im-
portant federal question areas, is not constrained by a federal statute
of limitations, but only by the doctrine of laches. A unanimous Su-
preme Court held:
[L]aches as a defense to an admiralty suit is not to be measured
by strict application of statutes of limitations; instead, the rule is
that "the delay which will defeat such a suit must in every case
depend on the peculiar equitable circumstances of that case." . . .
"This does not mean of course that the state statutes of limitations
are immaterial in determining whether laches is a bar, but it does
mean that they are not conclusive and that the determination
should not be made without first considering all the circumstances
bearing on the issue. . . ." [T]he existence of laches is a ques-
tion primarily addressed to the discretion of the trial court.yr
B. Maritime Law
This admiralty rule has been extended to apply to actions at law
arising out of federal maritime law.5 8  In a longshoreman's action at
the treaty of peace between the allied powers and Japan became fixed at the time of
the proclamation thereof.
56. 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1970); see Bell v. Aerodex, Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 871-
72 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1956). The
libel for injuries, allegedly caused by unseaworthiness and negligence, was filed seven
years after the accident and long after the pertinent limitations of both New York
and New Jersey had ran. The case was remanded to the district court to permit the
libellant the opportunity to prove facts negating laches; accord, Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963): "The test of laches is prejudice to the other
party.... The trial court, having heard the witnesses testify, concluded that there
was no prejudice."
58. Oroz v. American President Lines, Ltd., 259 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 908 (1959). H. BAER, ADMmALTY LAW OF TEM SurRani COURT
§ 1-10, at 239 & n.20 (2d ed. 1969) states:
If a claimant wishes to sue the shipowner in personam he may do so
either in admiralty where there is no jury or he may proceed under the
"saving to suitors" clause in a common-law court where he will have the
benefit of a jury trial.
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, while granting exclusive original
jurisdiction of civil causes in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the
federal district courts, expressly saved to suitors the right of a common-law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it. The section was
rewritten in the Judiciary Code of 1948, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1958), and
the "savings" clause now reads, "saving to suitors in all cases all other
1974]
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law to recover for a shipboard injury occurring in New Jersey territorial
waters five years earlier, a New York federal district court dismissed
the case after referring to the borrowing portion of the New York
statute of limitations which referred in turn to the New Jersey limita-
tion statute.59 In affirming, the Second Circuit said:
Here ...the suit is on the civil side of the federal court ...
which permits vindication of maritime rights through other reme-
dies. If a federal court were mechanically to apply a local limi-
tation statute in the instant case, it would be because "in law ac-
tions where a federally created right is being enforced, the fed-
eral courts will apply the applicable state statute of limitations in
the absence of a controlling federal statute of limitations."...
[T]he application of different time bars on different sides of
the federal court [is] at variance with the sound administration
of maritime law ....
[Tihe proper measure of the time within which suit must be
commenced is the admiralty doctrine of laches, not a local statute
of limitations ...
[]n deciding whether maritime claims are barred by laches,
courts of admiralty will use local limitation statutes as a rule-of-
thumb as to the presence or absence of prejudice by reason of
inexcusable delay. If the statute has run, prejudice by reason of
inexcusable delay is presumed in the absence of a showing to the
contrary; if it has not run, the converse is inferred.60
In 1971 in an action for damages for breach of contract, breach
of warranty, and indemnification, brought by the former owner of a
ship against the repairer more than six years after ship repairs had
been made, the federal district court denied a motion for summary
judgment based on an assertion of laches and refused to apply the six
year New York statute of limitations. 1 Defendant knew of the
lengthy arbitration proceeding that had taken place in the six year pe-
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." The rewrite was intended to
cover equitable as well as common-law remedies, but it must be conceded that
more apt language could have been used.
59. Oroz v. American President Lines, Ltd., 154 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
60. Oroz v. American President Lines, Ltd., 259 F.2d 636, 638-40 (2d Cir. 1958);
accord, Esso Transp. Co. v. Terminales Maracaibo, C.A., 356 F. Supp. 1367
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
61. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 337 F.
Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (mem.): "[Tihe starting point in the analysis is the an-
alogical [New York] state statute of limitations, in this case six years .... While
the analogy is considered to be weaker than it once was . . .where . . .the statute
has run ... detriment to the defendant will be presumed absent evidence to the con-
trary .... [P]laintiff will have the burden of persuasion that his action is not stale."
Id. at 517.
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riod between the former owner (plaintiff) and a purchaser of the re-
paired ship and had been advised by plaintiff that if the arbitration
resulted in loss to him, the plaintiff would seek recovery from the de-
fendant. Suit was filed within two months after the termination of the
arbitration. The court found that federal maritime law was appli-
cable and held: "[Tihe equities clearly militate against imposition of
the bar of laches." 62
Yet another application of laches as the time bar determinant in a
maritime tort situation was initiated by a Supreme Court dictum in
1970.3 The decedent longshoreman was killed while working on a
vessel in Florida navigable waters. The district court judge, in diver-
sity, dismissed the death claim based on unseaworthiness because the
Florida death act did not give a cause of action for unseaworthiness.
The Supreme Court, reversing its previous rule of decision,64 held that
an action lay under federal maritime common law for death caused by
violation of maritime duties, including unseaworthiness, even though
there was no federal wrongful death statute so providing. In response
to a defense argument that a statute of limitations must be devised
along with other ancillary matters if such a new wrongful death ac-
tion were judicially created, the Court said:
[Tihere is no reason-in federal admiralty suits at least-
that such actions should not share the doctrine of laches imme-
morially applied to admiralty claims. In applying that doctrine
.. .the courts should give consideration to the two-year statute
of limitations in the Death on the High Seas Act, just as they have
always looked for analogy to appropriate state or foreign statutes
of limitations. . . . We need not decide this question now, be-
cause the present case was brought within a few months of the
accident. . . . [H]owever . . . difficulties should be slight in
applying accepted maritime law to actions for wrongful death.65
62. Id.
63. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in Gaudette v. Webb, - Mass. -, -, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229
(1972), held: "Upon consideration of the Moragne decision and the sound reasoning
upon which it is based, we are convinced that the law in this Commonwealth has also
evolved to the point where it may now be held that the right to recover for wrongful
death is of common law origin, and we so hold." Further examination of these two
decisions appears at notes 129-30 and accompanying text infra.
64. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886).
65. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 406 (1970); see Note,
Admiralty-Wrongful Death Action Under General Maritime Law, 49 N.C.L. REv.
329 (1971); Comment, Nine Admirals at the Helm: A New Cause of Action for
Wrongful Death in Maritime Law-Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 1970 UTAH L.
REv. 653.
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C. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: A Statutory Variant of
the Admiralty and Maritime Laches Doctrine
A statutory variant of the admiralty and maritime laches doctrine
arises from the provisions of The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.00
These state that the laws of the United States extend to the outer conti-
nental shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures erected
thereon to the same extent as if the outer continental shelf were an
area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, 67 but also declare that the laws
of each adjacent state are to be the law of the United States for such
areas.
0 8
In an action against the platform owner, by an employee of an in-
dependent contractor, to recover for injuries suffered more than a year
earlier while working on a fixed drilling rig platform located on the
outer continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana, the question arose
whether laches or the Louisiana one year statute of limitations ap-
plied. 9 While this action was pending in the district court, the Su-
preme Court in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.7 0 held that
a suit for wrongful death occurring on a platform so situated is con-
trolled by Louisiana law and not by admiralty law. Relying on that
decision, the district court applied the Louisiana limitation and denied
relief. The court of appeals71 said that laches and not the Louisiana
statute of limitations was applicable and reversed. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that its decision in Rodrigue did apply to personal
injury actions as well as wrongful death actions, but should have pro-
spective effect only."2 The Court also stated:
It was the intent of Congress. . .that state laws be "adopted"
or "enacted" as federal law . ..Thus a federal court applying
Louisiana law under ... the Lands Act is applying it as ...
66. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
67. Id. § 1333(a)(1) (1970).
68. Id. § 1333(a)(2) (1970).
69. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
70. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
71. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); accord, Mullins v. Chev-
ron Oil Co., 344 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. La. 1972) (where accident occurred before,
but suit filed after, the Rodrigue decision). In Huson the Court of Appeals had held
that the Louisiana prescriptive limitation was not applicable in the federal court since
under Louisiana law prescription, unlike preemption, bars the remedy but does not ex-
tinguish the right. On this point the Supreme Court held: "Mhe 'prescriptive' nature
of Art. 3536 (the Louisiana statute) does not undercut its applicability under the Lands
Act. Under § 1333(a)(2) of the Act '[s]tate law be[comes] federal law federally en-
forced' [citing Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 353 (1971)]." 404
U.S. at 102.
504 [Vol. 52
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS' "
the law of the federal forum. Since the federal court is not, then,
applying the law of another forum in the usual sense, ordinary
conflicts of law principles have no relevance.73
D. Congressional Acts Without Limitation Provisions
Where the Congressional act providing the federal right does not
contain a limitation provision, the courts apply the most analogous
statute in which the action is brought. The civil rights cases74 are R1-
lustrative. For example in Knowles v. Carson5 the Fifth Circuit
held:
Sections 1983 and 1985 [of the 42 U.S.C.] do not include a
specific limitation. Since the Act contains no provision limiting
the time within which an action thereunder may be brought, the
applicable Statute of Limitations is that which the State would en-
force had the action seeking similar relief been brought in the
State Court.76
The selection of the "applicable" state statute may be difficult
but is probably not strictly a conflicts problem. In O'Sullivan v. Fe-
lix,7 7 the Supreme Court, in a case brought two years after the event,
held that the Louisiana one year prescription statute applied to an ac-
tion for assault and battery committed by defendants in a conspiracy
to prevent plaintiffs from voting in a federal election, and not the
five year federal limitation on actions to collect a penalty or forfei-
ture. In Henig v. Odorioso,78 plaintiffs, parents of an eleven year old
girl, sued all concerned for the arrest and detention of the girl for shop-
lifting. It was held that the Pennsylvania one year statute barred the ac-
73. 404 U.S. at 102-03. For a comprehensive treatment of both Chevron and
Moragne, discussed in text accompanying notes 63-65 supra, see IL BAER, supra note
58, at § 6-10.1a, -10.2 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
74. See, e.g., cases .cited note 76 infra.
75. 419 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969).
76. Id. at 370. This case also applied the one year federal limitation contained
in 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1970) to so much of the action as applied to that section.
Accord, Marnin v. Zampella, 456 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1972) (applying 42 U.S.C. §
1983); Butler v. Sinn, 423 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1970) (applying 42 U.S.C. 88 1983,
1985); Ballard v. Taylor, 358 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (applying 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). Similar applications have been made of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982; see
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972); Sims v. Order of
United Commercial Travellers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972).
98 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1964), contains an extended annotation entitled 'What stat-
ute of limitations is applicable to a damage action under Federal Civil Rights Acts."
See also Johnson v. Dailey, 479 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia
Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
77. 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
78. 256 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 385 F.2d 491 (3d Cir.) cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1016 (1967).
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tions for alleged false arrest, slander, malicious prosecution, and false
imprisonment following an arrest.
Where federal law applies the state limitation statutes, the state
tolling and borrowing provisions are normally applied as well. This
federal practice accords with the more general conflicts rule that where
the forum borrows a statute of limitations, this includes its tolling pro-
visions and other qualifications. 79 Since state rules regarding tolling
differ substantially, this introduces lack of uniformity in results in much
federal civil rights litigation. For example, where a plaintiff has been
imprisoned, the rule of California,"0 New York,81 and some other
states82 is that while the plaintiff is confined, the running of their stat-
utes of limitations is tolled, and for this reason federal courts have de-
nied motions to dismiss. In other states confinement of a plaintiff
does not toll the running of the statute on his causes of action, and
accordingly civil rights suits have been dismissed by federal courts as
barred. 3
This rule of application of all aspects of the state statute is sub-
ject to exceptions. The following three cases are illustrative: In a
suit brought by a state bar applicant under section 1983 seeking only
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Alabama State Bar, it was
held that in spite of the general rule, the one year Alabama statute
did not apply since the plaintiff was seeking only equitable relief to pro-
tect a federally created right.84  However, when an action is brought
both for damages and equitable relief, the statute of limitations, and not
laches, controls both the equitable and legal causes.8 5
79. United States ex rel. Sabella v. Newsday, 315 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); see Tandoe v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 857, 171 N.Y.S.2d 381
(1958). General conflicts arising from both borrowing and tolling provisions are dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 144-234 infra. A comprehensive annotation enti-
tied, "Federal court's adoption of state period of limitation, in action to enforce feder-
ally created right, as including related or subsidiary state laws or rules as to limita-
tions" appears in 90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1963).
80. Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971).
81. Uhited States ex rel. Sabella v. Newsday, 315 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
cf. Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 527 (2d Cir. 1973).
82. E.g., Miller v. Swenson, 338 F. Supp. 518 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Gordon v. Gar-
rison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Il. 1948); cf. Lathon v. Parish of Jefferson, 358 F. Supp.
558 (E.D. La. 1973).
83. E.g., Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1972) (New Jersey); Wil-
liams v. Hollins, 428 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1970) (Tennessee); Knowles v. Carson, 419
F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969) (Florida); see Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987
(E.D. Ark. 1972).
84. Nicholson v. Board of Comm'rs, 338 F. Supp. 48 (M.D. Ala. 1972); see An-
not., 162 A.L.R. 724 (1946).
85. Mizell v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970).
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It has been held that where a civil rights complaint was filed
within the applicable two year limitation of Pennsylvania law, but was
not served until four months after the two years had run, the federal
rule that a suit is commenced when it is filed applied and not the state
rule, and dismissal was refused. The court also held that the four
month delay in service did not constitute laches, but that as to those
defendants sued as "John Does" and not served until five and a half
years after the action was filed, the suit was barred by laches.8s
In a suit by a doctor alleging that a hospital district and its
surgical staff violated his civil rights in 1961 by suspending his surgi-
cal privileges and refusing to reinstate him, the Florida statute of limi-
tations was asserted. The plaintiff doctor had been continuously pur-
suing Florida state administrative and court remedies for the same
cause until just before the federal suit was commenced in 1967. The
district court held the action barred. The circuit court reversed and
remanded,8 7 holding:
[I]n cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United
States, a federal rule on tolling a state statute of limitations (when
applicable) should be observed, if such rule clearly carries out
the intent of Congress or of the constitutional principle at stake.88
A dissenting opinion stated:
It is well settled that actions under Federal Civil Rights laws
are governed by state statutes of limitations. This rule is now
abrogated by judicial decree.89
86. Fitzgerald v. Appolonia, 323 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1971); cf. Railing v.
UMW, 429 F.2d 780 (4th Cir 1970). The general question of when an action is
"commenced" is considered at text accompanying notes 251-73 infra.
87. Mizell v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970).
88. Id. at 474. The majority opinion reasoned:
We think it is clearly within the underlying purpose of the Civil Rights
Acts to encourage utilization of state administrative and court procedures to
vindicate alleged wrongs under a state-created cause of action before re-
quiring a plaintiff to bring his federal suit to prevent his being barred by a
state statute of limitations. Thus, although the federal courts apply a state
limitations statute in suits to vindicate a federal right, they look to the
federal purpose, policy and intent of Congress as to the objectives of the
legislation in determining whether the pursuit of state remedies tolls this
statute.
89. Id. at 476. A petition for rehearing en bane was denied by a tie (seven
to seven) vote by the members of the court. Petition for certiorari was not filed.
The authority of Mizell on this point is substantially eroded by a later decision
of the same court in Blair v. Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc., 467 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.
1972). In Blair the court held that suits by veterans for back pay for alleged violation
of reemployment rights accrued when the one year period of mandatory reemployment
expired. It held further that the suits were subject to the Alabama one year statute
of limitations from that date and were therefore barred. Finally, it held that a claim
that delay in bringing suit was the result of governmental bureaucratic procedures by
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Where the federal act contains no statute of limitations and the
state limitation is used, the determination of when the cause of action
accrues is controlled by federal and not state law.90 This applies even
though the period of limitation is borrowed from the appropriate
state.91 The determination of this federal rule in a given case may be
protracted and uncertain. Thus, in a suit for injury to property and
business brought in 1961 under the Labor Management Relations Act92
against the United Mine Workers for a continuing series of illegal
acts of destruction occurring in 1958 and 1959, the "accrual" issue re-
mained unresolved9 3 as late as 1971, though it had been to the United
States Supreme Court. This approaches justice delayed constituting just-
ice denied.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964,91 as distinguished from that of
1871, 9 ' does contain a statute of limitations which in part reads: "If
.. .the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance
with this subehapter, the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commis-
the Department of Labor and the Department of Justice did not toll the Alabama stat-
ute. The court said:
In his partially dissenting opinion Judge Tuttle [author of the Mizell
opinion] expressed the view that "The majority penalize the veteran for his
inevitable delay occurring after his complaint is filed with the Labor De-
partment but before the Government subsequently files suit against the em-
ployer. This would disembowel the Act." The majority respectfully dis-
agrees ... . With deference, it would "disembowel" the Act if this Court
were to hold that the Department of Justice, contrary to the law applied to
other litigants, may ignore the limitations clearly applicable under the Act
as Congress saw fit to enact it.
Id. at 819. In a separate opinion Judge Tuttle said:
Mizell is overruled sub silentio by failing to consider its application to
the facts of the case. The purpose of the state limitational statute rather
than the purpose of the federal substantive statute is given as to [sic]
touchstone for the decision whether or not to toll the limitation period.
Id. at 821. See also White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1973).
90. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941).
91. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
93. Railing v. UMW, 276 F. Supp. 238 (N.D.W. Va. 1967) rev'd, 429 F.2d 780
(4th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 486 (1971). In remanding the Su-
preme Court opined:
Whether suits under the two statutes [Labor Management Relations Act
and Clayton Act] are distinguishable for purposes of determining the time at
which a cause of action accrues warrants further exploration by the Court
of Appeals. Further attention should also be given to the question of why a
[Labor Management Relations Act] cause of action has sufficiently accrued
to bring suit as soon as the plaintiff suffers damage but has not sufficiently
accrued to start the running of the statute of limitations on the damages
already suffered and for which suit may be but is not brought.
401 U.S. at 486. This appears to be scanty guidance to aid in the ultimate resolution
of a cause already in litigation for ten years.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h (1970) Subchapter 1-Public Accommodations.
95. Ch. 22, §§ 1-7, 17 Stat. 13 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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sion shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within
thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the
charge .... "96 In a class suit based on alleged 1968 discriminatory
practices in discharging employees, letters of notice of failure to secure
voluntary compliance were dated July 15, 1970 and received between
July 22 and August 12, 1970. The suit was commenced August 21,
1970, and defendant moved for dismissal for time bar under a Tennessee
one year statute. In denying the motion the court stated:
This thirty-day period is jurisdictional and may not be extended
... . However, this thirty-day limitation period does not begin
to rin until the charging party has received notice from the Com-
mission of its failure to obtain voluntary compliance. . . [T]his
limitation statute performs a dual role. First, it insures that an
aggrieved individual will not file suit until the Commission has
had an opportunity to attempt conciliation. Second, it insures that
an aggrieved individual will not be precluded from suit by inaction
on the part of the Commission.
9 7
E. Antitrust Laws
Prior to 1956 no federal statute of limitations was applicable to
suits under federal antitrust laws,9" and in such litigation the stat-
utes of limitations of the state in which the district court was sitting
were applied. 99  In Clayton Act cases, section 4B, effective in 1956,
specifically imposed a federal four year statute of limitations.100 This
is illustrative of the fact that Congress may at any time preempt limita-
tion of federally given causes of action or may elect to withdraw a
federal statute of limitations previously imposed.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
97. Jackson v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 882, 885 (E.D. Tenn.
1970); accord, Kaltenborn v. Excel Personnel, 339 F. Supp. 129 (W.D. Tenn. 1972)
which held that the action was barred by the Tennessee one-year statute to the extent
it was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but not to the extent that it was based
on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
98. Gorden v. Loew's Inc., 247 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1957). This case held
that a New Jersey two year statute of limitations on actions brought under a penal
statute, was applicable to treble damage suits brought under section four of the Clayton
Act.
99. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
However, the federal doctrine that concealment of the cause tolls the statute was ap-
plied to borrowed state limitations in Clayton Act cases, see Moviecolor Ltd. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961), noted
in 75 HtAv. L. REv. 629 (1962).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1955), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
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When an antitrust suit accrues for limitation purposes may present a
complex question of fact. The guideline provided by the Supreme
Court is that forbidden acts which have long since taken place but as
to which the victim is unable earlier to prove with requisite certainty
the existence and amount of damages, such subsequent damages do
not accrue until they can be reasonably established, but the moment
the victim can prove such subsequent damages the four year statute
begins to run. 10'
F. Securities Laws
Other limitation problems arise out of the Securities Act of 1933102
and the amendments and additions thereto in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.103 Some of the numerous actions thereby created are ex-
pressly covered by federal statutes of limitation, 10 4 others are not. The
latter is true of actions under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act'05 and
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.10 6 Accordingly, the appropriate limita-
101. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971). The
Court said:
In antitrust and treble-damage actions, refusal to award future profits
as too speculative is equivalent to holding that no cause of action has yet
accrued for any but those damages already suffered. In these instances, the
cause of action for future damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on
the date they are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may sue to recover them
at any time within four years from the date they were inflicted ...
Otherwise future damages that could not be proved within four years of the
conduct from which they flowed would be forever incapable of recovery,
contrary to the congressional purpose that private actions serve "as a bulwark
of antitrust enforcement," . . . and that the antitrust laws fully "protect the
victims of the forbidden practices as well as the public"....
Id. at 339-40; accord, Poster Exchange Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 456 F.2d
662 (5th Cir. 1972).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970).
103. Ch. 404, tit. H, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); see Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
104. In Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972), the
court notes:
The original Securities Act of 1933 provided a limitation of two years
from discovery of the alleged misrepresentation for all civil actions under
the Act, and a ten year over-all limitation for all actions except those under
Section 12(2). . ... The 1934 amendments to the Act, however, reduced the
limitation period to its "present shrunken form": Sections 11(a) . . . 12(1)
and 12(2) . . . limited actions brought under these sections to one year
from discovery and three years from the time of wrong. . . . Substan-
tially the same limitations are applicable to actions under Sections 9(e)
.* 18. . . and 29(b) . . . of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Id. at 125 n.3. This complex situation has been examined in Schulman, Statutes of
Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv.
635 (1967).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). This section is commented on in Note, Securi-
ties Regulation-A Little Light and More Obfuscation on Rule 10b-5, 50 N.C.L. Rav.
706 (1972).
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tions act in the forum state of Illinois became controlling in an action
predicated on those two sections. 10 7  The court there held that the
three-year limitation provision of the Illinois securities law applied and
not the five-year Illinois statute applicable to fraud. It also held that in
a series of sales of corporate stocks by the defendant president of the
company to plaintiff employees of the company over a period of six
years, the limitations statute applied separately to each transaction from
the date of consummation. The court did read into the three-year limi-
tation the equitable doctrine that the statute does not begin to run un-
til fraud is discovered where a plaintiff remains in ignorance with-
out want of diligence on his part, but found that these plaintiffs, a
bookkeeper and a salesman of the corporation, had not exercised due
diligence.
The preceding examination of limitation problems which may
arise in actions based on federal rights seeks to present representative
situations only. It does not purport to be exhaustive of the myriad
specific questions that have arisen.' 08
5. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
The forum applies its own local statute of limitations to suits
brought on foreign judgments in the same manner as other causes of
action. 0 9 Where the foreign judgment is that of another nation, the
107. Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); accord,
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat,
386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
In Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 66 (M.D. Fla. 1972), a Securities Act
violation case, the court said:
[Tihis action was originally filed in federal court in New York. The case
was transferred [on] . . . defendants' . . . motion . . . pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) [for the convenience of the parties]. When an action is transferred
from a federal district court in one state to a federal district court in another
state pursuant to § 1404(a) the applicable limitation is that of the state
wherein the action was originally filed.
Id. at 76. This is wholly consistent with the pronouncement in Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964), that "A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be,
with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms." Id. at 639.
108. See Developments In The Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV.
1177, 1264 (1950); Note, The Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Federal
Courts, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 865 (1971); Note, State Statutes of Limitations in Federal
Courts: By Whom Is The Statute Tolled? 1971 DuKE LJ. 785. See also Annot., 90
A.L.R.2d 265 (1963).
109. See Wurfel, Recognition of Foleign Judgments, 50 N.C.L. REv. 21, 50
(1971), and authorities cited therein; Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 567 (1954); 47 AM. JuR.
2d Judgments §§ 953-54 (1969); accord, Dodd v. Lovett, 46 Ala. App. 686, 248 So. 2d
724 (1971).
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full faith and credit clause110 of the the Federal Constitution does not
apply. 1' Where the foreign judgment is that of a sister-state it has
been frequently argued" 2 that unique treatment is mandated. Such
is not the case.
In the absence of a borrowing provision in the forum statute, the
forum's own limitations on suits on judgments are applied to those of
sister-states. 1 3 Thus, a judgment not yet time barred where rendered
may be denied enforcement if the forum limitation on judgments has ex-
pired; such procedure does not violate the full faith and credit
clause.114 This is true even where the forum statute provides a shorter
enforceable period for foreign judgments than that prescribed for its
own domestic judgments, so long as the forum applies the statute only
to sister-state judgments that have not been revived by proceedings in
the judgment-rendering state within the forum's own judgment limi-
tation period. 1 5 Conversely, the forum may enforce a sister-state
judgment already barred by a shorter statute of limitations in the
judgment-granting state. Moreover, this second judgment must be
given full faith and credit by the original judgment state as well as
by the courts of other states." 6 If a borrowing provision of the forum
state adopts the shorter limitation of the judgment-granting state, the
latter will be applied.
For a federal court judgment to be enforceable by registration in
another federal court," 7 it must not be time barred at the time of such
registration by the statutes of the state in which the registration oc-
curs. Thus, a federal district court judgment rendered in Alaska and
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
111. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
112. See, e.g., id.
113. Sayer v. Henderson, 225 N.C. 642, 35 S.E.2d 875 (1945); Webb v. Webb,
222 N.C. 551, 23 S.E.2d 897 (1943); accord, Dodd v. Lovett 46 Ala. App. 686, 248
So. 2d 724 (1971); Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 468 P.2d 627 (1970); Catlett v.
Catlett, 412 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1966); see Matanunska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor,
365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 914 (1967); Annot., 36 A.L.R.
2d 567 (1954).
114. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); McElmoyle ex rel.
Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839); Strickland v. Watt, 453 F.2d 393(9th Cir. 1972); RESTAThMENT (SECoND) oF CONFLICT OF LAws § 118(2) (1971).
115. Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966); see Strickland v. Watt, 453 F.2d
393 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Bank of the State of Alabama v. Dalton, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 522 (1850).
116. Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Weir v. Corbett, 40 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNmicr op LAws § 118(1) (1971).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970) provides for such registration of final judgments
of any federal district court and then their direct enforcement in the federal court in
which registered.
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not barred in Alaska, but barred in Washington at the time it was
registered in the federal district court in Washington, was denied en-
forcement. 1 8 The court held that though the enforcement action
was not a diversity case, there was nothing in the federal registration
act to permit the limitation statute of the state of registration to be
ignored, and accordingly the Klaxon principle119 of invoking the forum
state's conflict of law rules was applicable. This result is consistent
with the conventional classification of statutes of limitations as proce-
dural for conflict of law purposes and, hence, determinable by forum
local law.
The problem of when a statute of limitations runs on a foreign
continuing alimony or support decree calling for periodic payments, is
a recurring one. North Carolina 20 had early occasion to pronounce
what has become the general rule, which is that the forum statute is
applied not to the original date of such a judgment but separately to
each required periodic payment as of the date it becomes due. 21
In Delaware there was no statute of limitations as to judgments or
actions on judgments but only the rebuttable common law presump-
tion of payment after twenty years. In a suit on a New York judgment
filed in Delaware one day before the New York twenty year statute on
judgments ran, it was held that under these circumstances the New
York statute would be applied but had received compliance by the suit
in Delaware. 2
A North Carolina case points up the difference in treatment ac-
corded judgments in personam and judgments in rem awarded in sis-
ter states.' 2 3 A West Virginia money judgment for rent was obtained in
1926 in an in rem proceeding against office furniture in West Virginia.
In 1930 suit was brought on the West Virginia judgment in North Caro-
lina to collect the balance due. The court held that since the West
Virginia judgment was not in personam, the applicable North Caro-
118. Matanunska Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 914 (1967).
119. See note 20 supra.
120. In Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N.C. 190, 197, 37 S. 212, 214 (1900), the
court said, "The plea of the statute, in an action in our state on a judgment obtained
in another state, is a plea to the remedy, and consequently the lex fori must prevail
in such an action."
121. E.g., Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 468 P.2d 627 (1970); Catlett v. Catlett
412 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1966), and authorities cited therein.
122. Guayaquil & Q. Ry. v. Suydam Holding Corp., 50 Del. 424, 132 A.2d 60
(1957).
123. Smith v. Gordon, 204 N.C. 695, 169 S.E. 634 (1933).
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lina limitation was three years upon the original debt and not the ten
year limitation on judgments.
The general subject of foreign judgments and problems of judg-
ment in rem and quasi-in rem, in particular, have been the subject of
a separate article by this author.124
6. Is THE LIMITATION STATUTE PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE?
THE SPECIFICITY TEST AS TO WHICH LIMITATION GOVERNS
Traditionally statutes of limitations, particularly those applicable
to common law causes of action, have been characterized as "proce-
dural" and hence governed by forum law in conflict situations. 125
With the expansion of causes of action given only by statute and in
derogation of the common law, limitation provisions in such statutes,
or those limitations made specifically applicable thereto began to be
usually characterized as "substantive", that is, as being an integral part
of the statutory cause of action itself,1 6 and therefore, controlled by
loci law where different than the law of the forum. 2 7  There has
been erosion of this latter doctrine, at least in wrongful death cases,
by the common practice of applying whichever statute is shorter.128
More recently there has been a judicial trend to find that wrongful
death, long considered only a statutory cause of action and not a com-
mon law right, has now ripened into a common law action 129 and
that, accordingly, the applicable limitation bars only the remedy, not
the right, and may be tolled or waived. 130
124. Wurfel, supra note 109.
125. Holdford v. Leonard, 355 F. Supp. 261, 263 (W.D. Va. 1973); Tieffenbrun
v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930) (annotated in 68 A.L.R. 217
(1930) ). This Approach may be applied where the cause of action arises in a foreign
country, Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955); Baldwin
v. Brown, 202 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d 139
(Alas. 1962).
126. Gaston v. B.F. Walker, Inc., 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968); see Bournias
v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
127. Keep v. National Tube Co., 154 F. 121 (D.NJ. 1907); Theroux v. Northern
Pac. R.R., 64 F. 84 (8th Cir. 1894); see Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1964).
128. Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930); see Annot.,
146 A.L.R. 1356 (1943); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1311, 1324 (1932).
129. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), discussed in text
accompanying notes 63-65 supra; Gaudette v. Webb, - Mass. -, 284 N.E.2d 222
(1972).
130. Gaudette v. Webb, - Mass. -, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972). The court, ex-
pressly overruling its long and consistent line of authority to the contrary, said:
[O]ur wrongful death statutes will no longer be regarded as "creating
the right" to recovery for wrongful death. They will be viewed rather as
. requiring that the action be commenced within the specified period of
time as a limitation upon the remedy and not upon the right. We further
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The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the forum
state may properly apply its own shorter statute of limitations to a suit
brought on a foreign wrongful death statute, since it is not a denial of
full faith and credit.1 31  If the forum elects to apply the longer or
shorter limitation of the loci it may, but it is not obliged to do so.
This line of decision arose where the forum did not have a borrow-
ing statute. Where there is a borrowing statute, there is generally no
difficulty in applying the shorter statute of the jurisdiction in which
hold that statutes limiting the period for bringing actions for death are to be
construed in the same manner as the limitations contained in . . . the gen-
eral statute of limitations, and that in appropriate cases they may be
tolled ....
Id. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
The North Carolina evolution in the treatment of wrongful death limitations took
place earlier and more gradually than did the Massachusetts transition. The North
Carolina wrongful death statute was enacted in 1854. Ch. 39, § 1-4, [1854] N.C.
Sess. Laws 97-98. The limitation read "action shall be commenced within one year
from the death . . . ." The time limit of one year therein prescribed was held to
be a condition annexed to the cause of action. Taylor v. Cranberry Iron & Coal Co.,
94 N.C. 525 (1886). "This is not strictly a statute of limitations. It gives a right
of action that would not otherwise exist, and the action to enforce it, must be brought
within one year after the death of the testator or intestate, else the right of action
will be lost. It must be accepted in all respects as the statute gives it." Id. at 526;
accord, Colyar v. Atlantic States Motor Lines, Inc., 231 N.C. 318, 56 S.E.2d 647
(1949).
Moreover, in affirming dismissal of a case in which a resident of Florida brought
suit in North Carolina for a Miami automobile accident death just before the Florida
two year limitation expired, it was held the North Carolina one year time limit was
a 3tatute of limitations as well as a condition annexed to a liability. Tieffenbrun v.
Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930). The court said:
All statutes of limitations are essentially time clocks, and while C.S.,
160, has been construed as a condition annexed to the cause of action, it is
also a time limit to the procedure. . . Certainly, it is not to be supposed
that the legislative department intended to confer upon nonresidents more
extensive rights in the courts than accorded to citizens of this State.
Id. at 404, 151 S.E. at 861.
Until 1951 the one year limitation provision was an integral part of the North
Carolina wrongful death statute, Ch. 113, § 70, [1868] N.C. Sess. Laws 276 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966) ), applied in Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec.
Memb. Corp., 249 N.C. 90, 105 S.E.2d 282 (1958). See also Kinlaw v. Norfolk S.
Ry., 269 N.C. 110, 152 S.E.2d 329 (1967) (held when the two days preceding the
commencement of the action fell on Sunday and Labor Day respectively these were
both to be excluded in computing the two year period). The legislature then removed
it from the wrongful death statute, increased the time to two years, and placed it in
the chapter of the statutes dealing with statutes of limitations in general. Ch. 246,
U9 1-4, [1951] N.C. Sess. Laws 203 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53(4) (1969)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court thereafter held that: "The [1951] amendment re-
moved the time limitation as a condition annexed to the cause of action and made
it a two-year statute of limitations." Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 691, 133 S.E.
2d 761, 763 (1963); cf. McCrater v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 248 N.C. 707,
104 S.E.2d 858 (1958). Thus the bar now is only to the remedy and not to the right
itself.
131. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); accord, as to a personal
injury case, Horvath v. Davidson, - Ind. App. -, 264 N.E.2d 328 (1970).
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the cause of action arose without regard to whether it is substantive or
procedural. North Carolina, using its borrowing statute, has thus ap-
plied the shorter Pennsylvania limitation to a wrongful death action
brought by Maryland residents arising out of an air crash in Pennsyl-
vaia.
Suits brought under wrongful death statutes have typically in-
volved this "substantive" versus "procedural" issue, but the issue may
be raised in any action based upon a right created by statute. For ex-
ample, as to suits to recover damages under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, 133 the North Carolina rule continues to be that the limita-
tion extinguishes the right.3 Thus, where the widow of a volunteer
fireman sought recovery in the Industrial Commission for her husband's
death but did not file the claim within one year, the court affirmed
dismissal by the Commission, holding:
G.S. 97-24 provides in pertinent part: "(a) The right to
compensation under this article shall be forever barred unless a
claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within two years
after the accident, and if death results from the accident, unless a
claim be filed with the Commission within one year thereafter."
This Court has held the requirement that a claim be filed in
accordance with ... the above statute constitutes "a condition
precedent to the right to compensation, and is not a statute of
limitations."'1 35
No indication is given as to whether this result is derived from the
fact that the limitation is contained in the chapter of the statutes
dealing with workmen's compensation and not the general statute of
limitations chapter, or because of the language "shall be forever
barred," or from other reasons.
The local law of each state determines whether its own limita-
tion statute bars the right or only the remedy. Where the question in
the forum is whether the right or the remedy is barred by the limita-
tion imposed by the loci state, this question is determined by the con-
flicts law of the forum. The forum conflicts rule normally requires
the adoption of the classification made by the loci state. If the other
state holds its limitation to be substantive, the forum will enforce it
132. Broadfoot v. Everett, 270 N.C. 429, 154 S.E.2d 522 (1967).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. cl. 97 (1972).
134. Montgomery v. Horneytown Fire Dep't, 265 N.C. 553, 144 S.E.2d 586(1965).
135. Id. at 555, 144 S.E.2d at 587; see Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1955), for a
discussion of statutes of limitations applicable to action, by way of subrogation or the
like, by employer or insurance carrier against a third person for injury to the employee,
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rather than the longer130 or shorter' 37 procedural limitation of the forum.
If the loci state holds its limitation to be procedural, the forum then ap-
plies its own statute of limitations, subject to its own borrowing provi-
sions, if any.138
136. Capps v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 183 N.C. 181, 186, 111 S.E. 533, 536
(1922). In Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 153 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1946) the
Second Circuit held that in an action under the North Carolina wrongful death statute
brought in New York Supreme Court and removed to federal court, the [then] North
Carolina rule that the one year limitation in the statute is a condition precedent to
maintenance of right of action must be applied, and barred the action though it would
not have been barred by the New York statute of limitations. Accord, Ramsay v.
Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970) (wrongful death suit in Mississippi for air-
crash in Belgium); Bengston v. Nesheim, 259 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1958) (diversity ac-
tion in Washington for wrongful death in Oregon, held barred by two year Oregon
limitation which was not tolled by the subsequent removal of defendant from Oregon
to Washington, and that Washington three year statute was inapplicable); Pack v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957) (suit based on air crash wrong-
ful death in New Jersey held barred by two year New Jersey limitation and Delaware
three year limitation and borrowing provisions were not applicable even in behalf of
a Delaware resident decedent); Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.
1972) (suit for wrongful death by aircraft in Missouri); Francis v. Herrin Transp.
Co., 423 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (Louisiana one year statute applied in
suit for Louisiana wrongful death, rather than two year Texas statute), rev'd, 432 S.W.
2d 710 (Tex. 1968) (remanded for determination whether under all the facts the Lou-
isiana statute had been tolled); see 37 J. Am. L. & CoM. 235 (1971); Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 1162 (1964).
137. Theroux v. Northern P. R.R., 64 F. 84 (8th Cir. 1894) (diversity suit in
Minnesota for wrongful death in Montana upheld where suit was brought after the
Minnesota two year limitation had run but before three years as provided in the Mon-
tana statute); Marine Const. & Design Co. v. Vessel Tim, 434 P.2d 683 (Alas. 1967)
(Washington three year limitation applied to suit in Alaska to enforce a statutory lien
for labor and services furnished to the vessel in Washington, and not the shorter Alaska
limitation. This case contains an extensive discussion of the authorities); California
v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967 (1958) (in suit
to recover cost of care for dependent mother of defendant, held that California four
year statute and not the shorter Texas limitation applied to defendant's liability while
still a resident of California). Contra, Michigan v. First Nat'l Bank, 17 Ariz. App.
45, 495 P.2d 485 (1972) (dictum), where the Arizona Court of Appeals said: "[S]ub-
stantive status is only achieved when the time limitation is shorter in the state of origin
than in the forum, and has no applicability where the limitation extends the time."
Id. at 49, 495 P.2d at 489.
It should be recalled that it is constitutional for the forum to time-bar a wrongful
death action that is timely under the built-in limitation provision of the loci statute.
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
138. Haury v. Allstate Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1967). In holding diver-
sity suit brought in New Mexico was not barred by a California statute providing that
a demand for arbitration must be made by the insured within one year against his
insurer under an uninsured motorist policy clause, the court said:
New Mexico has held that the law of the forum determines the bar of
statutes of limitation. A well recognized exception to this rule is that the
local statute of limitations governs unless the foreign statute is part of the
foreign substantive law. New Mexico has not passed on this point but it is
fair to assume it will follow the general law. In such an event, the Cal-
ifornia statute does not apply because in California the statute of limitations
is procedural rather than substantive and is effective only to bar the rem-
edy.
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Where the cause of action arises in a foreign country, or in a
sister state in which the nature of the limitation has not been adjudi-
cated, the forum may itself make the determination. Perhaps the best
statement of the various tests available to make this determination con-
tinues to be that expressed in 1955 in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Co.139 There the plaintiff was a seaman in the employment of the de-
fendant company at the time it changed registry of its vessel from Pan-
ama to Honduras. A provision of the Panama Labor Code required
upon change of registry that seamen be paid three months extra
wages, and article 623 of that Code provided "Actions . . .arising
from labor contracts . . . shall prescribe in a year from the happening
of the events .... -140 Suit for such wages, and penalties for non-
payment, was brought by the seaman in the United States federal dis-
trict court in New York more than one year after his discharge but
within the limitation prescribed by the applicable federal statute. The
Id. at 34; accord, Natale v. The Upjohn Co., 356 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1966) (diver-
sity suit in Delaware district court based on cause of action arising in Pennsylvania;
held, Pennsylvania four year limitation applicable to breach of sales contract is proced-
ural and not part of the substantive right created by the statute allowing recovery for
breach of warranty. Thus, Delaware two year and not Pennsylvania four year limita-
tion is applicable); Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1965) (diver-
sity suit in New York for personal injuries in New Jersey resulting from defendant's
negligence; held, the New Jersey Railroad Law statute with a two year limitation did
not preclude plaintiff from maintaining a common law tort action in New York filed
within the New York tort three year limitation); Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839
(5th Cir. 1959) (diversity suit in Louisiana for medical malpractice in Indiana; held,
since the Indiana limitation, which had not yet run, was procedural only, the shorter
Louisiana limitation, which had run, was applicable); Page v. Cameron Iron Works,
Inc., 259 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1958) (diversity suit in Texas by Florida resident pilot
against Texas aircraft manufacturer for injuries resulting from plane crash in Louisiana;
held, the suit is timely since the shorter Louisiana limitation is procedural and the
longer Texas limitation is here applicable); Chartener v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.
N.Y. 1967) (diversity survival and wrongful death actions by California husband for
New York malpractice on wife; held, the applicable limitations of both California and
New York are procedural, hence the New York limitation applies including the New
York tolling provisions).
A further application of the "substantive-procedural" test is found in Earnhardt
v. Shattuck, 232 F. Supp. 845 (D. Vt. 1964) (personal injury diversity suit by North
Carolina resident in Vermont against Vermont residents arising out of a Connecticut
accident; held, under Connecticut law the one year Connecticut limitation is procedural,
thus the action is timely brought within the three year Vermont limitation period since
Vermont has no borrowing statute applicable to non-resident defendants); Michigan
v. First Nat'l Bank, 17 Ariz. App. 45, 495 P.2d 485 (1972) (discussed supra, in text
accompanying notes 14-15); Sherley v. Lotz, 200 Va. 173, 104 S.E.2d 795 (1958)
(held, that a suit in Virginia brought under a Tennessee survival statute for death re-
sulting from a Tennessee accident was barred by the Virginia one year personal injury
limitation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 142 (1971); cf. Gates
v. Trans World Airlines, 493 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
139. 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
140. Id. at 154.
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district court dismissed. The court of appeals reversed, holding the
action was brought in time. It noted that six tests could be used to de-
termine whether the limitation was substantive or procedural. These
were: (1) whether the same statute that created a new liability con-
tained a limitation of time within which the liability could be en-
forced; (2) whether a limitation in a different statute was so specifi-
cally directed at a newly created liability that it could be said to qualify
the right; (3) whether the defense to the limitation would be classified
as "substantive" or "procedural"; (4) whether the operation of the
limitation completely extinguished the right; (5) whether the foreign
court concerned viewed the limitation as "procedural" or "substantive";
(6) whether the limitation is couched in language commonly re-
garded as "procedural" rather than "substantive".' 41
The court found that for the instant case the "specificity" test was
the most appropriate. It said:
[B]ecause of the breadth of the Panama Labor Code . . .
the limitation period should not automatically be regarded as
"substantive". Nor would it be appropriate to make this case
turn on the fact that the right sued upon was unknown at com-
mon law. . . when we are dealing with the statutes of a country
where the common law does not exist.
We conclude . . . the "specificity" test is the proper one to
be applied in a case of this type, without deciding, of course,
whether the same test would also be controlling in cases involving
domestic or other kinds of foreign statutes of limitations. 142
These guidelines, while helpful, do not prescribe a hard and fast rule.
The impact of "significant relationship" and "policy analysis" ap-
proaches to choice of law problems upon the selection of the applic-
able statute of limitations is discussed in a subsequent section of this ar-
ticle.143
7. BoRRowING PRovisioNs
The general rule that the statute of limitations of the forum is ap-
plicable to the exclusion of loci law has been modified by most state
legislatures by adopting "borrowing" provisions as an integral part of
their own statutes of limitations.
In general, a borrowing provision is usually applied only to cur-
141. Id. at 155-56.
142. Id. at 154.
143. See text accompanying notes 294-315 infra.
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tail, and not to enlarge, the applicable limitation of the forum.' 44  This
is also the rule where the "substantive" built-in limitation of the loci is
shorter. 145  Thus, if the period of time prescribed by the forum statute
has run, the action is barred in the forum even though not barred by the
statute of limitations of the jurisdiction in which the cause arose.
This is true whether or not the forum statute contains a borrowing pro-
vision.14 6 This rule is subject to -the exception, previously stated, that if
the loci limitation statute is by loci law considered to be an integral
part of the cause of action itself and is longer than that of the forum,
the forum may, 47 but is not constitutionally required to, apply the
longer statute of the loci. 148
Such borrowing provisions have been held to be constitutional even
where they do not apply to a plaintiff who was at all times a citizen of
the forum state. Thus, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Min-
nesota statute which read:
When a cause of action has arisen outside of this state and, by
the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there
144. Natale v. The Upjohn Co., 356 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1966); Conner v. Spencer,
304 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1962); Keaton v. Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D. Mo.
1969); Prince v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 282 F. Supp. 832, 839 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
see Shamie v. Shamie, 45 Mich. App. 384, 206 N.W.2d 463 (1973); Lindsey v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 491 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. ,1973).
However, a state may construe its borrowing statute as making applicable u limita-
tion of the loci longer than that of the forum, where the cause of action arose else.
where. Thus, since Kentucky courts had so held, in a diversity case, brought in Ken-
tucky, it was held that a suit for injuries suffered in New York commenced after the
Kentucky one year statute had run, but before the New York three year statute had
run, was not barred. Koeppe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 250 F.2d 270 (6th
Cir. 1957); accord, Collins v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 299 F.2d 362, 364 (6th
Cir. 1962). This minority Kentucky rule was expressly overruled by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1965), where it held barred an action on an Illinois accident instituted after the
expiration of the one year Kentucky limitation but before the expiration of the two
year Illinois limitation.
The Uniform Statute of Limitation on Foreign Claims Act provides: "The pe-
riod of limitations applicable to a claim accruing outside of this state shall be either
that prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law of
this state, whichever bars the claim." By 1971 this act had been adopted in three
states: Michigan, Oklahoma and West Virginia, see Wilson v. Eubanks, 36 Mich. App.
287, - n.5, 193 N.W.2d 353, 355 n.5 (1972). The Michigan statute, MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.5861(2) (1962), was applied in Pusquilian v. Cedar Point, Inc., 41 Mich. App.
399, 200 N.W.2d 489 (1972).
145. Pack v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 50 Del. 413, 132 A.2d 54 (1957).
146. See Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA.
L. RFv. 33, 66 (1962).
147. State v. Eis Automotive Corp., 145 F. Supp. 444 (D. Conn. 1956).
148. See notes 131-32 and accompanying text supra.
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barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be maintained in
this state unless the plaintiff be a citizen of the state who has
owned the cause of action ever since it accrued. 149
The court said:
[T]he constitutional requirement is satisfied if the non-resident is
given access to the courts of the State upon terms which in them-
selves are reasonable and adequate for enforcement of any rights he
may have, even though they may not be technically and precisely
the same in extent to those accorded to resident citizens. 150
In other words, borrowing statutes, by their terms, may be made inap-
plicable to resident plaintiffs if that status existed when the foreign
cause of action originally accrued. All other provisions of the forum
limitation statutes remain applicable to such plaintiffs.
A 1953 decision held that the statute of limitations of North Car-
olina, as then stated, never ran as against either a nonresident or resi-
dent plaintiff until the defendant had been present in North Carolina
for the time required by its limitation statute, and this rule applied
even though both parties were non-residents and the cause of action
arose outside of the state.' 5' Upon recommendation of the Judicial
Council' 52 this statute was changed in 1955 to include a borrowing
provision. ' 3 This enactment was held, in an unappealed diversity de-
cision in the Federal District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, not to be a borrowing statute but simply to be a limitation to
prevent the operation of the North Carolina tolling provisions where
149. MN. STAT. § 7709 (1913) (presently MWa,. SrAT. ANN. § 541.14 (1947)).
150. Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562 (1920); see Chemung Canal
Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72 (1876); accord, Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop,
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640, 644 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
151. The Merchants & Planters Nat'l Bank v. Appleyard, 238 N.C. 145, 77 S.E.2d
783 (1953). This common law rule that: "Statutes of limitations are universally re-
garded as peculiar and local laws, operating exclusively within the bounds of the state
that enacts them," is discussed at length in Nonce v. Richmond & D.R.R., 33 F. 429,
432 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1887).
152. Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 334, 148 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1966); 33 N.C.L.
Rav. 531 (1955).
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1969) reads:
If when the cause of action accrues or judgment is rendered or docketed
against a person, he is out of the State, action may be commenced, or judg-
ment enforced within the times herein limited after the return of the person
into this State, and if, after such cause of action accrues or judgment is
rendered or docketed, such person departs from and resides out of this State,
or remains continuously absent therefrom for one year or more, the time of
his absence shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action or the enforcement of the judgment. Provided, that where a
cause of action arose outside of this State and is barred, by the laws of thejurisdiction in which it arose, no action may be maintained in the courts of
this State for the enforcement thereof, except where the cause of action origin-
ally accrued in favor of a resident of this State.
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the claim is barred by the lex loci if the original potential plaintiff was
not a resident of North Carolina.154 The same issue reached the
North Carolina Supreme Court in a later case. Asserting its prerogative
under the Erie doctrine, the court disapproved the earlier federal court
reading of the statute and held it to be a borrowing statute except
where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a resident of
North Carolina. 155
Normally borrowing provisions refer only to the jurisdiction in
which the cause of action "arises". Thus, the time a defendant is pres-
ent in any jurisdiction, other than the forum or where the cause of
action arose, is not to be considered in applying a borrowing provi-
sion. For example, in West v. Theis'" the maker of promissory
notes in Kansas left Kansas without paying, but before the Kansas
period of limitations on the notes had run. He went to Washington and
lived there for more than six years, the Washington limitation period on
promissory notes, and then moved to Idaho where the holder of the notes
brought suit before the Idaho statute of limitations had run. The
court held the action would lie because it was not barred in Kansas
154. Snyder v. Wylie, 239 F. Supp. 999 (W.D.N.C. 1965). Plaintiff, an Ohio resi-
dent, sued defendant, a North Carolina resident, for injuries sustained in Virginia more
than two but less than three years before the diversity suit was filed in the federal
district court in North Carolina. Applicable limitations were respectively, North Caro-
lina three years, Virginia two. Judge Craven held:
(2) There is no general "borrowing" statute which refers our courts to lex
loci for determining prescription periods.(3) Only when the claim is stale under lex for, and only when the cir-
cumstances invoke the application of the "tolling" statute to revive it, are
our courts referred to lex loci delicti for determination of the period of
prescription.
[iThe Supreme Court of North Carolina ... would permit Snyder to
prosecute his claim which is stale in Virginia for the simple reason that it is
not stale under the prescription law of the State of North Carolina, which is
the law to be applied.
Id. at 1003.
155. Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E.2d 201 (1966). Plaintiff, a resident
of Tennessee, sued in North Carolina for personal injuries suffered in Tennessee more
than one year before action filed. Defendant had been physically present in North
Carolina more than a year before the action was commenced, but his place of residence
was not determined. Limitations were, Tennessee one year, North Carolina three. In
holding the suit time barred, Justice Sharp, writing for a unanimous court, said:
The closely reasoned opinion in Snyder employs such lucid "convolution
of theory" that admiration for its artistry tempts its adoption. Nevertheless,
our conclusion-likewise drawn from the legislative history of the proviso--
is that the Legislature intended it to be a limited borrowing statute, operat-
ing to bar the prosecution in this State of all claims barred either in the state
of their origin, or in this State.
Id. at 334, 148 S.E.2d at 205; accord, Broadfoot v. Everett, 270 N.C. 429, 154 S.E.2d
522 (1967); see Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, 45 N.C.L. Rav. 842, 845 (1967).
156. West v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908); accord, McKee v. Dodd,
152 Cal. 637, 93 P. 854 (1908).
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since the Kansas statute was tolled by the absence of the defendant
from Kansas, and the Idaho borrowing provision could not be applied
to the limitation period prescribed in Washington or any other third
jurisdiction where the cause of action did not arise.
This same Idaho case announced the generally accepted rule that
entry into the state fixes the time the statute starts to run as to a per-
son who comes within the state who has never been there before, as
well as to one who departs from the state and then returns to its
jurisdiction. 157
The absence of a federal statute of limitations applicable to a fed-
erally created right causes resort not only to the appropriate limitation
rule but also the borrowing provisions of the forum state. Acccord-
ingly, by application of the New York borrowing provision, an action
in New York state courts for wrongful discharge in California was barred
by the shorter California limitation where the cause "arose."' 158
In a diversity case it has been held that the Erie requirement that
the forum state limitation statute is applicable in the federal court ac-
tion, includes its borrowing provision as construed by state courts of
the forum. 159 Specifically, a diversity suit for contribution by one co-
surety in a California transaction brought in Colorado against Colo-
rado domiciled co-sureties was held not to be barred by the appli-
cable two-year California limitation where the defendants, though they
had made various trips to California, had not been present there for an
aggregate of two years. The federal appeals court interpreted the Col-
orado Supreme Court decisions construing the effect of the Colorado
borrowing provision to be that "if an action is not barred in the state
where the cause of action arose, because of the defendant's absence
therefrom, it is not barred in Colorado."'10
Complex questions arise as to how much of the loci law is in-
cluded when its statute of limitations is borrowed by a forum statutory
157. West v. Theis, 15 Idaho 167, 96 P. 932 (1908), the statute there in issue
read:
If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the
state, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, after
his return to the state, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs
from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action.
REv. STAT. OF IDAHO § 4069 (1887) (presently IDAHO CODE § 5-229 (1948)); accord,
as to a statute of limitations which then contained no borrowing provision, Merchants
& Planters Nat'l Bank v. Appleyard, 238 N.C. 145, 77 S.E.2d 783 (1953).
158. Tandoc v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 857, 171 N.Y.S.2d 381
(1958); see Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1963).
159. Schoenfield v. Neher, 428 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1970).
160. Id. at 156.
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provision. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines,"6 1 a diversity wrongful
death suit in a federal court in New York in which plaintiff's decedent,
a resident of South Carolina, was killed in an aircraft crash in Califor-
nia, is illustrative. At the time of the death the widow plaintiff was
sixteen. At the time of suit she was a resident of New York but
had been appointed administratrix in South Carolina. California
law imposed a one year limitation on wrongful death actions which be-
came applicable to a married female plaintiff at age eighteen. Under
South Carolina law its one year statute of limitations did not start to run
against a married woman until age twenty-one. The suit in New York
was filed just before the plaintiff reached age twenty-two. The New
York statute, borrowed, as against a non-resident plaintiff, the limita-
tion of "the state or country where the cause of action arose."'162  The
court of appeals affirmed the district court decision that this New
York borrowing provision applied the California statute of limitations
in its entirety, embracing all of its accoutrements including its tolling
provisions during minority and its definition of what constituted minor-
ity.163 The court also agreed that the law of the then domicile of the
plaintiff should not be referred to for this latter purpose.
Nolan has been cited with approval in at least two subsequent di-
versity cases' 64 where the plaintiffs were non-residents of New York.
One said:
Whether these causes of action, involving . . . internal af-
fairs of a Tennessee corporation and arising there, are time barred
must be determined in accord with the body of law which would
be applied by New York, the forum state. . . . New York would
161. 276 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'g 173 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The
opinion of Judge Friendly contains the celebrated language, "Our principal task, in this
diversity case, is to determine what the New York courts would think the California
courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought. They have had no
occasion to do so." 276 F.2d at 281. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 363
U.S. 836 (1960), and in 365 U.S. 293 (1961) remanded for a determination as to
whether California law then barred the action of the infant daughter plaintiff because
the action of the adult mother was barred. On remand the court of appeals in 290
F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1961) held that it did, reaffirmed its judgment of dismissal and
said: "[W]e cannot believe the Supreme Court of California meant to overturn, with-
out citation, an unbroken line of decisions of intermediate appellate courts, of thirty
years standing, consistent with that policy. Since we cannot believe this, we equally
cannot believe the New York Court of Appeals could believe it." Id. at 907-08. As
to this second decision, certiorari was denied in 368 U.S. 901 (1961).
162. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 13, presently N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 202 (McKinney
1972).
163. CAL. CIv. CODE § 25 (West 1954), as amended (West Supp. 1973).
164. Chartner v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Lowell Wiper Supply
Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640 (1964).
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apply its "borrowing statute" and bar this suit if the limitation pe-
riod had run either here or in Tennessee. Relevant to this determi-
nation are not only the statutory period itself, but "all its accountre-
ments', including tolling doctrines and rules governing accrual of
causes of action.'6 5
The Michigan Court of Appeals reached an opposite result in a
case arising out of an Ontario automobile accident where the seventeen
year old plaintiff and the defendant were both Michigan residents. 166
The Michigan borrowing statute required the application of the one
year Ontario statute of limitations rather than the three year Michigan
statute. Michigan law thereafter lowered the age of majority so that
plaintiff became of age on January 1, 1972, and she filed suit on
June 9, 1972, which was more than two but less than three years
after the accident. Michigan law provided that a minor may bring
suit within one year after reaching majority. Ontario had no such law
and did not toll the running of the statute against actions accruing to
minors even during their minority. Reversing a summary judgment for
defendant, the court ruled:
[W]e hold that the shorter Ontario limitations period applies
to plaintiff's claim but that Michigan's disability statute tolled the
statute of limitations until one year after plaintiff's minority ended.
[T]he trial judge erred in holding that the limitations period
constituted a procedural bar to litigation of plaintiff's suit on the
merits. 167
In multi-state transactions whether a borrowing statute applies
often turns on determinations of where and when a cause of action ac-
crues. Such a case is Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto-
motive Air Brake Co.'"8 Defendant (Bendix) sold brake pedal as-
semblies to plaintiff (Mack) in Pennsylvania who in turn sold one to a
Florida resident. A defect in the assembly caused an accident in Flor-
ida resulting in a Florida judgment against plaintiff which was satisfied
on June 30, 1960. Though Mack gave Bendix timely notice of the
Florida suit, it did not file the diversity suit for indemnity against
Bendix in Pennsylvania until October 10, 1963. The suit was not time
barred in Pennsylvania. However, Pennsylvania's borrowing statute
stated "When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the
165. 235 F. Supp. at 643-44; cf. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th
Cir. 1966); Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
166. DeVito v. Blene, 47 Mich. App. 524, 209 N.W.2d 728 (1973).
167. Id. at -, 209 N.W.2d at 731.
168. 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967).
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state . . . in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete defense
."169 In affirming a decision that the action was barred by the
three year Florida statute the majority said:
[T]he cause of action for indemnity arose when Mack satis-
fied the judgment ... in ...Florida. ... [T]he concept[s]
of when. . and. . . of where a cause of action arises . . . are
in pari materia. . [T]he cause arises where as well as when the
final significant event that is essential to a suable claim occurs.
• .. Under the Pennsylvania borrowing statute a court is re-
quired to apply the statute of limitations of the state where the
cause of action arose without regard to any contacts of any other
state with the parties and their prior dealings.170
A dissenting opinion stated:
[T]he present cause of action for indemnity arose in Penn-
sylvania where there originated the contractual relationship be-
tween the parties out of which the right of indemnity arose, rather
than in Florida where . satisfaction of the judgment was made
which ripened the claim for indemnity and started the time of the
running of the statute of limitations.171
In Prince v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, a later Penn-
sylvania diversity case following Mack, the court said: "It is clear that
in arriving at. . .when the cause of action arose, the [Mack] court
relied on Pennsylvania decisional law.' 1 2 In Prince, a New Jersey ad-
ministratrix, on behalf of a deceased New Jersey resident, sued in 1965
in Pennsylvania for wrongful death and also brought a survival suit for
damages predicated on both negligence and breach of warranty in in-
jecting a cancer-inducing drug in Pennsylvania in 1944. Death oc-
curred late in 1963 in New Jersey, and it was alleged the cancer was
first discovered in New Jersey shortly before death. Suit was filed more
than one but less than two years after death. As to the wrongful death
suit the court held the shorter one year Pennsylvania limitation applied
and hence, the Pennsylvania borrowing statute did not come into play.
Similarly it held that the warranty cause of action, which accrued in
Pennsylvania in 1944, was barred by the Pennsylvania six year stat-
ute. Regarding the negligence cause, the court felt bound by Mack
to determine by Pennsylvania law when the cause of action arose. It
found that the cause of action did not arise until discovery of the negli-
gence in 1963. Both Pennsylvania and New Jersey negligence limita-
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 39 (1953).
170. 372 F.2d at 20-21.
171. Id. at 26.
172. 282 F. Supp. 832, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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ton statutes were two years and had not expired since the alleged date
of discovery. Defendants contended that New Jersey law should ap-
ply, and that in New Jersey the cause of action ran from the date of
the negligent act. Defendants asserted that once it was determined
the cause of action arose in New Jersey, there must be a new determina-
tion as to when the cause of action arose under New Jersey law and
that the court "should totally disregard the answer to that question
earlier provided by Pennsylvania law."'173 The court rejected this ar-
gument and denied a motion for summary judgment as to the survival
negligence action, saying: "In Mack, the majority simply measured the
Florida statute of limitations from the date the action arose, a date
determined by Pennsylvania law alone."' 7" The court did go on to
find it did not believe that under New Jersey law the cause of action
would arise until the negligence was discovered.
The apparent discrepancy between Nolan, which holds that a bor-
rowing statute embraces all of the accoutrements of the limitations law
of the jurisdiction borrowed from, and Mack and Prince which held
that when the cause of action arises is to be determined by forum law,
might possibly be explained by the different wording of the respective
New York and Pennsylvania borrowing statutes. The former read:
Where a cause of action arises outside of this state, an action
cannot be brought in a court of this state to enforce such cause
of action after the expiration of the time limited by the laws either
of this state or of the state or country where the cause of action
arose .... "75
The Pennsylvania language is:
When a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of
the state or country in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete
defense to an action thereon brought in any of the courts of this
commonwealth. 76
However, "arose" seems to be the key word in each statute, and
the use of the word "when" in the latter statute, standing alone, does
not impel the use of forum law to determine when a cause of action
arose. Since, in each case, the question is one of conflict of laws, as to
which Erie compels federal diversity courts to adhere to the rule of the
state in which it sits, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will inter-
173. Id. at 842.
174. Id.
175. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 13, presently N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 202 (McKinney
1972) (emphasis added).
176. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 39 (1953) (emphasis added).
19741 527
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
vene to establish uniformity since no constitutional mandate is in-
volved. These constructions, arrived at by the courts of appeal for
the Second and Third Circuits, are, under Erie, subject to be changed by
later decisions of the state courts of last resort in New York and
Pennsylvania, respectively, should they so elect. Such new rule would
apply only to cases then in litigation or thereafter brought. 177
Two other cases further illustrate the complex problems which
arise when determinations of when and where causes of actions arise
are juxtaposed with questions concerning the application of borrowing
statutes. Chartener v. Kice, held that the diversity cause of action in a
New York survival suit for pain and suffering resulting from alleged
malpractice by a New York doctor in the treatment of a California resi-
dent in New York, "accrued . . . in New York immediately upon
the termination of the last treatment, and, therefore . . . the borrow-
ing statute is inapplicable." 17 However, in the same case it was held
that the wrongful death action for the subsequent death in California
arose in California, and that the New York borrowing statute would ap-
ply unless the shorter New York statute had run. The wrongful death
suit was brought within one year of the death and so was timely under
California law. However, under New York law when the underlying
wrongful death cause of action is for malpractice the two year malprac-
tice limitation applies to the wrongful death action and starts to run
from the time the malpractice occurred. This period had expired, but
the question remained whether events had tolled the running of the
New York statute. This depended under New York law on whether
the decedent was rendered incompetent by defendant's tortious act
prior to her death. A factual determination of these limited issues un-
der New York law was ordered, prior to proceeding to trial on the
merits.27 9  The use here of New York law is appropriate since it was
found that the cause of action arose in New York at the time of treat-
ment, was barred in the forum, and could not be saved by the borrow-
ing statute which applies only to causes of action "accruing without
the state".' 80
177. Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 424 F.2d 427, 429-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
178. 270 F. Supp. 432, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
179. Id. at 439.
180. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. I.Aw § 202 (McKinney 1972) provides:
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state can-
not be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of
either the state or the place without the state where the cause of action ac-
crued, except that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of
the state the time limited by the laws of the state shall apply.
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Similarly, the borrowing portion of the New York limitation stat-
ute is inapplicable to causes accruing elsewhere to residents of New
York. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.181 held that as to
such plaintiffs only New York law is applicable as to all aspects of
limitation questions. In that case an Oklahoma airline corporation
and two New York resident passengers, in consolidated proceedings, sued
Curtiss-Wright in New York for damages suffered in a plane crash in
Florida under the theory of breach of implied warranty. New York
law was applied to bar suit by the New York residents, and Florida
law was applied, via the New York borrowing statute, to permit the ac-
tion of Braniff, the Oklahoma corporation, to proceed. In 1956 defen-
dant sold the airplane engines involved in the March 25, 1958 Florida
crash. The report does not indicate where the sale was made. Bran-
iff sued in the federal district court in New York on March 21,
1960. The two passenger suits were not filed until December 23,
1963, and March 24, 1964, respectively. Under New York law the
limitation on suit for breach of warranty is six years and commences
to run from the date of sale. The Florida limitation is two years, but
does not start until the defect was, or should have been discovered.
The New York plaintiffs' contention that the six year New York limita-
tion should apply but that the Florida rule of time of discovery should
mark when the action accrued was rejected by the court.'82 Non-resi-
dent Braniff's suit, filed in 1960, was held to be not barred in either
Florida or New York.'8 3
181. 424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970); accord, Coan
v. Cessna Aircraft, 53 I. 2d 526, 293 N.E.2d 588 (1973), holding the Illinois bor-
rowing statute inapplicable where plaintiff and one defendant in a personal injury suit
arising out of an airplane crash in Kentucky were residents of Illinois.
182. There appear to be no New York decisions precisely in point....
The general aim of statutes of limitation is to cut short pursuit of stale
claims; in New York a relatively long period of limitations is sharply cut
back by the rule that the cause for implied warranty accrues at the sale, and
not at discovery of breach. The New York policy... is to afford a litigant
no more time to sue than that contemplated by the interplay of the two
rules. The same may be said of Florida's shorter time limit, which is in
effect extended by beginning computation at discovery rather than sale....
[W]e have no reason to believe that New York would choose to extend its
already long period of limitations by permitting the Florida accrual at dis-
covery rule to govern.
F : : lorida, by its accrual at discovery rule, has placed a greater
burden than has New York on manufacturers who may cause injlry within
that state. The additional standard of care imposed by Florida is not unlike
a "rule of the road." . . . The time an action accrues imports "notions of
substantive law."
424 F.2d at 430-32.
183. The sales took place in 1956; suit was filed in 1960, making the
action timely in New York. Assuming that the time of the crash [1958]
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In an earlier diversity warranty case brought in New York, the
same circuit held that the cause of action of Texas resident crew mem-
bers against an airplane manufacturer for injuries sustained in a Flor-
ida crash of a plane manufactured and delivered in California to the air-
line "arose" not in Florida but in California within the New York bor-
rowing statute, and that the California one year statute of limitations
barred the New York action.'1 4  This decision, in which certiorari was
denied," 5 would appear to have made material in Braniff the place where
title to the engines passed, unless this too was in the state of Florida, yet
this fact was not determined in Braniff.
The preceding Nolan, Mack, Chartener and Braniff cases em-
phasize the importance of a minute reading of the applicable borrowing
statute. They also point up the duty of federal courts in diversity to
apply the state rule as to all aspects of borrowing, if ascertainable, and
if not to divine what it will be when presented to the forum state
courts for decision. This is simply a specific application of general
Erie doctrine.
However, in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, the federal
courts are bound by federal policies even though they must look to
the analogous statute of limitations of the forum state as a step in as-
certaining whether a plaintiff has been guilty of laches. 186 Thus, the
New York borrowing statute was held not to be applicable to a colli-
sion occurring eight miles off the Venezuelan coast, though this area
was claimed by Venezuela as territorial waters and the Venezuelan
period of limitations had expired.187  A motion to dismiss for laches
was denied since the analogous New York three year limitation had
not expired.
was the first time that Braniff had notice of the defects in the engines, it
also satisfied the Florida statute, since the Florida Supreme Court . . . indi-
cated that its limitation period ran from the time when the party "discovered
or should have discovered" the defect.
Id. at 430.
184. George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 904 (1964); accord, O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1113 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The
latter case held that where the aircraft was manufactured, sold and delivered in the
state of Washington, Washington law applied in an Illinois diversity action against the
manufacturer by nonresident plaintiffs who, asserting breach of warranty, sought dam-
ages resulting from a crash of the plane in Italy.
185. 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
186. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
187. Esso Transp. Co. v. Terminales Maracaibo, C.A., 356 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973).
New York's "borrowing statute," CPLR § 202, is not applicable in the
instant case. The courts of the United States have consistently deferred to
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It is possible for two borrowing statutes by their different provi-
sions to raise the renvoi question.'18 . Such a case is Hobbs v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. 189 Plaintiffs, injured in an accident in Ken-
tucky, commenced a suit in diversity in Indiana against an Ohio cor-
porate defendant more than one, but less than two years after the acci-
dent. The Indiana limitation in bodily injury cases is two years, but
as to causes arising outside the state, the Indiana borrowing statute
provides: "[W]hen a cause has been fully barred by the law of the
place where the defendant resided such bar shall be the same defense
here as though it had arisen in this state. .... "0 The Ohio limitation
in bodily injury cases is two years, but the Ohio borrowing statute reads:
If the laws . . . where the cause of action arose limit the time for
the commencement of the action to a lesser number of years than
do the statutes of this state in like causes . . . then said cause
• . . shall be barred in this state at the expiration of said lesser
number of years. 19
The Kentucky limitation for bodily injury is one year. 92  In the ab-
sence of Indiana authority, the court denied a motion to dismiss.
After an extended discussion of the renvoi doctrine, the district court
held that renvoi is not part of United States law and accordingly the
borrowing provision of Indiana law should embrace only the specific
prescription period and not the borrowing provision of the Ohio
statute. In rejecting renvoi the court relied in part on the provi-
sions of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws Second.193  The court
reasoned that borrowing provisions of the limitation law of a state are a
statutory part of its conflict of laws rules, whereas the specific periods of
the judgment of the legislative and executive branches in refusing to recog-
nize claims by other nations to a territorial sea greater than three miles in
breadth .... The collision, approximately eight miles off the Venezuelan
coast, must be viewed as occurring on the high seas so that no other juris-
diction's law would be applicable under CPLR § 202.
Id. at 1369.
188. Renvoi, of course, may become a problem where the forum looks to the con-
flicts rule, rather than to the substantive rule of another jurisdiction. With great re-
straint, the author refrains from discussing renvoi. For detailed explanations, see a
highly selected abbreviated bibliography: A. Von Meheren, The Renvoi and its Rela-
tion to Various Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem, in XXmrH CENTURY COM-
PARATIVE AND CoNFLicrs LAw 380 (1961); Griswold, Renvoi Revisisted, 51 HAv. L.
REV. 1165 (1938); Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law
(pts. 1-2), 10 CoLUM. L. REV. 190, 327 (1910); Rabel, Suggestions for a Convention
on Renvoi, 4 INT. L.Q. 402 (1951).
189. 195 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
190. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-606 (Burns 1960).
191. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.20 (Page 1953).
192. Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1) (a) (Supp. 1972).
193. RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) Op CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 7-8 (1971).
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prescription are a part of its internal or domestic law. This analysis,
which is consistent with general conflict of laws doctrine, supports the
decision refusing to enter into renvoi by refraining from resorting to
the conflicts rule of Ohio. Although the court did not expressly so
classify it, the situation presented is one which invites transference ren-
voi rather than classical renvoi. The court did point out that if the
Kentucky borrowing statute had referred to the law of the residence of
the defendant, then in four steps, instead of the usual two, an end-
less circle would have been established. The Kentucky borrowing stat-
ute, in fact, referred to the limitation of the place of collision, but the
court found this to be applicable only if it were shorter than the Ken-
tucky limitation.'9 4 Moreover, since Kentucky was the place of colli-
sion, this precluded the possibility of further transference renvoi.
The preceding Hobbs case is consistent with Nolan,'9 5 to the extent
that in each the court refused to apply the law of a third jurisdiction
once the borrowing statute of the forum had referred to the limitation
statute of a second jurisdiction. They part company when Hobbs
excises borrowing provisions of the limitation statute of the second
jurisdiction from "all of its accoutrements", which Nolan says are ap-
plicable.'96
At least two states hold that their borrowing statute does not apply
if the cause of action arose in a state in which the defendant could not
be summonsed. Thus, in Western Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Service
Gas Co.,197 where plaintiff pleaded that its claim accrued in the Dis-
trict of Columbia more than three years before suit filed in Oklahoma,
and the defendant asserted the cause was barred by the three year
District statute of limitations, the court found that the District of Co-
lumbia courts had no jurisdiction over the defendant and held: "We
see no reason to conclude that the Oklahoma Legislature . . . intended
to borrow the limitation law of a jurisdiction in which the defendant
cannot be summonsed."'' 98 The Oklahoma court pointed out that the
194. 195 F. Supp. at 63, relying on Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.320 (1942). This
conclusion appears to be contrary to the results reached by the Sixth Circuit in Prince
and Collins cited in note 144 supra. However, since the district court rejected renvol
in all forms so far as borrowing statutes are concerned, this conclusion, if erroneous,
would not affect the decision of the case.
195. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1960); see note 161
and accompanying text supra.
196. 276 F.2d at 283, see note 165 and accompanying text supra.
197. 507 P.2d 1236 (Okla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972); accord, Green
v. Kensinger, 199 Kan. 220, 429 P.2d 95 (1967).
198. 507 P.2d at 1243.
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District of Columbia tolling provisions would not have been applicable to
this case. The Oklahoma borrowing statute under consideration de-
fined "claim" as "any right of action which may be asserted in a civil
action or proceeding ... "199
Where a cause of action arises both in the forum state and a sec-
ond state, the borrowing statute of the forum is applicable to bar the
action by applying the limitation of the second state.200
The preceding discussion of borrowing statutes is sufficient to indi-
cate that they raise complicated conflicts problems. Subsequent sec-
tions of this article undertake to isolate and discuss specific areas of
difficulty.
8. TOLLING PRovIsIoNs
Since forum borrowing statutes frequently bring into play the toll-
ing provisions of the limitation statute referred to, some tolling prob-
lems were inevitably encountered in the preceding section on borrow-
ing. Here attention is devoted to situations raising primarily multi-state
tolling questions.
Parrish v. B.F. Goodrich Co.201 reflects a subtle application of the
tolling principle. Plaintiffs sued in Michigan for personal injuries sus-
tained when a tire manufactured by defendant blew out in Ohio. The
tire was sold in Michigan, and the blow out occurred just under three
years prior to commencement of the Michigan suit. The trial court
dismissed, holding the two year Ohio limitation statute applicable under
the Michigan borrowing statute. The Michigan Court of Appeals re-
versed. It first observed that characterizing the warranty theory of
product liability as contract or tort was procedural and to be deter-
mined by Michigan law which declares it to be a tort action for which
the Michigan limitation period is three years. The court then referred
to section 600.5833 of the Michigan statutes which provides that: "In
actions . . . based on breach of. . .warranty. . . the claim accrues
at the time the breach . . . is discovered or reasonably should be dis-
covered." 202 It also noted: "The period of limitation applicable to a
claim accruing outside of this state shall be either that prescribed by the
199. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 104-08 (Supp. 1972).
200. Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1973); Pattridge v. Palmer, 201 Minn.
387, 277 N.W. 18 (1937).
201. 46 Mich. App. 85, 207 N.W.2d 422 (1973); cf. Stell v. Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 306 F. Supp. 17 (W.D.N.C. 1969); see note 235 infra.
202. Mca. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5833 (1962).
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law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law of this state,
whichever bars the claim."203 It next adverted to the Michigan Uni-
form Commercial Code section which in pertinent part provides:
(1) An action for breach of any contract of sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued
(2) ...A breach of warranty occurs when tender of de-
livery is made ....
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the
statute of limitations.204
The court reconciled the two statutes holding
the language of the commercial code to the effect that a breach of
warranty occurs at delivery should be used to determine where
the cause of action accrued, not when. There has been a long
standing policy in Michigan that the statute of limitations should
not expire before the damage has been suffered. . . . M.C.L.A.
§ 600.5833 ... should be read as a tolling statute, unaffected
by the subsequent language of the commercial code ...
[T]he causes of action. . . accrued in Michigan where the poten-
tial liability for breach of warranty occurred, but. . . the limita-
-tion period did not begin to run until the damage was suffered
• .. [P]laintiffs' . . . causes of action for breach of warranty
• ..did not accrue outside this state ... , and hence, are not
barred by the Ohio statute of limitations. 20 5
The more normal context of conflicts tolling problems is the direct
question whether the borrowing statute of the forum extends to include
the tolling provisions of the loci limitations statute to which it refers. The
great weight of authority is that it does, and whether that statute has
been tolled is to be determined by loci law.20 6 Accordingly, where,
nearly five years after the event, a Kansas resident sued a Missouri resi-
dent in Missouri for damage inflicted on livestock in Kansas and the de-
fendant had been present in Kansas only briefly during this time, it
was held that the five year Missouri statute rather than the two year
Kansas statute, applied. The court reasoned that under Kansas law the
absence of the defendant from Kansas tolled the Kansas statute, and
accordingly the Missouri borrowing statute did not come into play.207
The court said: "[P]laintiff's cause of action was not 'fully barred' by
203. Id. § 27A.5861(2) (1962).
204. Id. § 27A.5833 (1962).
205. 46 Mich. App. at -, 207 N.W.2d at 426.
206. Annot., 149 A.L.R. 1224 (1944).
207. Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. App. 1958).
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the Kansas statute of limitations and hence was not barred by the Mis-
souri borrowing statute. 208
Where loci states continue to view wrongful death action limita-
tions as extinguishing the right, forum states hold their borrowing stat-
utes do not extend to the general tolling provisions of the loci state.
Thus, in a diversity suit in a Washington federal district court for a
wrongful death by drowning in Oregon, brought slightly more than two
years after the event, the action was held barred by the Oregon two year
statute and not saved by the fact that the defendant had ceased to be a
resident of Oregon shortly after the death, which by Oregon general toll-
ing provisions would have suspended the running of the Oregon stat-
ute.20 9  Washington's limitation statute contained a borrowing provi-
sion and a three year limitation on wrongful death actions. The court
said:
Obviously, the Washington court will apply Oregon law be-
cause this is an integral part of the act creating the right; it is not
mere procedure, as a normal statute of limitations would be.2 10
Similarly, it has been held that the six year statute in patent in-
fringement law is a condition on the right, and not the remedy, and
may not be extended by fraud or concealment on the part of the de-
fendant.2 11  However, *the three year limitation on Federal Employer
Liability Act suits was held to be tolled by the fraud of the defendant
practiced on an infant which induced delay in bringing suit.2 12  In
these two cases the courts were simply determining whether the cir-
cumstances tolled the applicable federal limitation provision.
Where federal courts apply a state statute of limitations to a fed-
erally created cause of action, they generally adopt all of the statute in-
cluding its tolling. provisions. For example,-in Louisiana a suit for a
prison death was brought within one year after the event against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 13 More than one year
after the event, a Louisiana sheriff was added as a party defendant. - It
was held that the one year statute of Louisiana, applicable to suits
against sheriffs, did not bar the action since Louisiana law also provides
208. Id. at 936.
209. Bengston v. Nesheim, 259 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1958).
210. Id. at 567. The court states this result is'the overwhelming weight of author-
ity, citing Annot., 132 A.L.R. 292 (1941); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 1070 (1930). See also
Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965).
211. Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940).
212. Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949).
213. Williams v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1226- (E.D.tLa. 1973).
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that a suit brought against one person tolls the prescription against all
persons co-obligated.214
However, federal courts, in federal question cases, will not always
adopt state tolling provisions. The clearest case in which they will re-
fuse to do so is when the tolling provision conflicts with existing federal
law. For example, in a treble damage antitrust suit brought in a New
York federal district court for conduct in Connecticut, the court applied
the New York borrowing statute which looked to Connecticut law, but
refused to apply the Connecticut tolling provision. That provision
would have prevented the bar of the Connecticut three year statute be-
cause the defendant corporation was not "doing business in Connecti-
cut" in the conventional sense.2 15 The court said:
[W]e . . . hold as a matter of federal law that in a suit to
enforce a federal claim, the existence of a federal statute rendering
the defendant subject to suit in Connecticut precludes the adoption
of state service of process rules to determine whether the defend-
ant was without the state within the meaning of a state tolling
statute. . . . While state law may be adopted by federal law
where Congress has not spoken, in order to fill the interstices of
federal enactments, it may not be adopted where it supplants or
conflicts with existing federal law.216
The application of tolling provisions by federal courts sitting in
diversity does not produce uniform results since the Erie mandate is
that normally the federal court must follow the conflicts rule of the
state in which it sits and reach the same borrowing and tolling results
reached by the supreme court of that state, or if the supreme court
has not spoken, the results which the federal court believes that state
supreme court will reach when the matter is submitted to it.211
214. Id. at 1231.
215. Banana Distrib., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959).
216. Id. at 794.
217. The following cases are illustrative:
In Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1957), brought in a federal district
court in Pennsylvania for injuries sustained in a Delaware accident, plaintiff was per-
mitted to amend his complaint to allege facts showing a dismissal without prejudice,
on venue grounds, of a prior suit on the same cause which had been timely commenced
in a federal district court, in- Delaware, since under such circumstances a new action
could be brought under Delaware law within one year after such dismissal. The second
suit in Pennsylvania was filed more than one, but less than two years after the acci-
dent and within less than a year after the dismissal of the action in Delaware. The
limitation in Delaware was one year, in Pennsylvania two. It was held that since
under the Delaware law the suit was not fully barred in Delaware, it was not barred
within the meaning of the Pennsylvania borrowing statute. Cf. Litten v. Peer, - W.
Va. -, 197 S.E.2d 322 (1973), holding that the dismissal of a previous federal court
action on the same cause for lack of prosecution, was a dismissal on the merits, and
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An interesting case arises when diversity actions in different states
are consolidated. Does the federal court hearing the case have to ap-
ply the borrowing statute of the forum state, or may it use the limita-
acted as res judicata to bar the later state court action even though the running of
the statute of limitations had been tolled.
In Wade v. Lynn, 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960), suit was filed in the fed-
eral court in Ohio more than one but less than two years after an accident occurred
in West Virginia. Nine months after the accident the defendant moved permanently
from West Virginia to Ohio, and under West Virginia law this tolled the running of
the one year West Virginia statute. Ohio's limitation period was two years, but its
borrowing statute had been construed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Payne v. Kirch-
wehm, 141 Ohio St. 384, 48 N.E.2d 224 (1943), to extend to the limitation imposed
by the state in which the cause arose but not to matters which would there toll that
limitation. The diversity suit was held to be time-barred by applicable Ohio law.
In Andrew v. Bendix Corp., 452 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1971), a North Carolina
administratrix brought a wrongful death suit in 1965 in a federal district court in Ohio
against a Delaware corporation for a death in North Carolina in 1960. Plaintiff had
filed an identical suit in the federal court in the District of Columbia in 1961 which
was dismissed for want of prosecution in 1964, just within one year before the suit
was filed in Ohio. To prevent the application of the Ohio two year statute of limita-
tions, plaintiff relied on an Ohio savings statute permitting commencement of a new
action within one year after an action fails other than upon the merits. OHIo Rv.
CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1953). Whether this saving statute extended to actions
commenced outside of Ohio had not been determined by the Ohio courts. In holding
that the time within which to sue was not extended by the prior out of state suit,
the court relied upon a North Carolina decision (among other cases). The Andrew
court noted:
A . . . recent state court decision . . . is High Admr. v. Broadnax
Therein the original wrongful death action was instituted in . . .
Virginia, and following its nonsuit a new action was filed in North Carolina
after the statute of limitations had run but within the one-year period pre-
scribed by the North Carolina savings statute. In holding the latter statute
inapplicable, the court stated, "We adhere to the general rule that a statute
of the forum which permits a suit to be reinstituted within a specified time
after dismissal of the original action otherwise than upon its merits has no
application when the original suit was brought in another jurisdiction."
452 F.2d at 963.
In Mizell v. Welch, 245 F. Supp. 143 (D. Conn. 1965), plaintiff sued in Georgia
state court for injuries sustained there in 1962. Upon removal to the federal court,
the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over defendant's person. Plaintiff 'on
November 19, 1964 sued on the same cause in a federal court in Connecticut. The
applicable statute of limitations in Connecticut is one year. The court held:
[I]t would be anomalous . . . to extend the benefit of a remedial
Connecticut statute. . . to a Georgia litigant in a situation where no remedy
would be available to a Connecticut litigant. . . Plaintiff, having failed ....
to bring his action within the time prescribed by Connecticut law . . . can-
not reap the benefit of the Connecticut Accidental Failure of Suit Statute
and is, therefore, barred from seeking relief in this Court. . .
Id. at 144. This happens to be consistent with the Georgia rule which holds that a
mere filing of a suit, absent personal service, will not serve to toll the statute of limi-
tations; see Davis v. Patrick, 128 Ga. App. 730, 197 S.E.2d 743 (1973). - -
A seemingly contrary result was reached in Speight v. Miller, 437 F.2d 781 (7th
Cir. 1971). Plaintiff filed a personal injury suit in Tennessee within- one year after
the 1967 accident occurred in Tennessee. The defendant had moved from Tennessee
to Illinois and could not be served in Tennessee. More than one year after the acci-
dent, plaintiff sought to effect service -on the Tennessee Secretary of State, but the
Tennessee long arm statute then provided that such service could be accepted -only with-
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tion period and tolling provisions of the other state? In Bott v. Ameri-
can Hydrocarbon Corp.21 8 plaintiff who had been employed in California
by the defendant, a Delaware corporation, brought a diversity suit in
federal court in Texas in 1969. Later in the same year he brought an
identical suit in a California state court, seeking recovery on claims aris-
ing in California in 1965. The California suit was removed to a federal
court in California, and that court transferred it to the federal court in
Texas where it was consolidated for trial with the other pending ac-
tion. Defendant asserted the statute of limitations, which in both Cali-
fornia and Texas was two years. Plaintiff countered that defendant had
not done business in California since May 1965 and that this tolled the
running of the California statute. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held in these circumstances that the California tolling provision
would be applied.219 In doing so it reversed the district court which
had held the action barred by the Texas two year limitation. The
Texas federal court suit was the first filed, 220 and Texas has no specific
borrowing statute which would call into play the California tolling
statute. Moreover, under the usual rules, if the action were barred by
the Texas statute of limitations, its borrowing statute would not come
into play.
The case of Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co. 22 1 raises the is-
sue of the tolling effect of the pendency of the first of identical suits in
different federal courts and concludes this is a matter to be determined
in one year of the accident. Plaintiff in 1969 sued on the same cause in a federal
district court in Illinois. The trial court dismissed the suit as being barred by the
Tennessee one year statute of limitations by means of the Illinois borrowing statute.
The court of appeals in reversing, construed the Illinois borrowing statute, ILL. ANN,
STAT. ch. 83, § 21 (Smith-Hurd 1966), as borrowing the tolling as well as the limita-
tion provisions of Tennessee law. It then pointed out that the Tennessee law provided:
"The suing out of a summons is the commencement of an action ...whether it be
executed or not, if the action is duly prosecuted . . . or recommenced within one (1)
year after the failure to execute." TNN. COD ANN. § 28-105 (1955); accord, Vance
v. Blegen, 366 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. 1971), noted in 39 TENN. L. REV. 341 (1972).
218. 441 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1971).
219. [We are persuaded that Texas would apply California's tolling rule,
so that the Texas District Court, with the two cases before it, would apply
California law in the consolidated trial because it is the law that would be
chosen by both states. However, even if Texas' choice of law were differ-
ent, so that the District Court was required to choose between competing
rules for the consolidated trial, we have no doubt that the primacy of
California interests should prevail and that the court should choose California
law.
Id. at 900. The phrase "primacy of California interests" seems to smack of a "most
significant relationship" choice of limitation law, the subject of a subsequent section
in this article, see text accompanying notes 294-315 infra.
220. Cf. Parham v. Edwards, 346 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
221. 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970).
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
by federal rather than state law. Here plaintiff, a Virginia resident,
was injured in Virginia by a defective machine manufactured in Ken-
tucky by the defendant, a Kentucky corporation. Since Virginia then
had no long arm statute, plaintiff sued in a federal district court in Ken-
tucky within the two year limitation of Virginia but not within the one
year limitation of Kentucky. Contrary to the rule in the vast majority
of jurisdictions, Kentucky's borrowing statute, as then construed,
adopted the limitation of the loci state regardless of whether that limi-
tation was longer or shorter than Kentucky's. While this diversity ac-
tion was pending the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed its former
rule and held that Kentucky limitations applied to causes accruing
elsewhere if the limitation in the state where the event occurred was
longer than that of Kentucky.2 2' The Kentucky federal district court
applied the new Kentucky rule to the pending action and dismissed
it as time barred. The court of appeals affirmed, and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.2 23  The second action was
brought in a federal court in Virginia after Virginia enacted a long arm
statute. This was before the suit in Kentucky was dismissed but was
more than two years after the injury. The suit in Virginia was dismissed
as time barred under Virginia law. 2 4  The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, held the first suit tolled the Virginia time bar,
and said: "We conclude that we must seek the answer as a matter of
federal, not state law. ' 22 5 Two of the seven judges, sitting en banc on
222. Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965),
see note 144 supra.
223. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir.), cert. denfed, 389 U.S.
829 (1967).
224. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967).
225. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 538 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971), noted in 71 COLUM. L. REV. 865, 875-80 (1971); critically
noted in 50 TEXAs L. REv. 162 (1971). Since the case decides a new point and has
at least tentative Supreme Court approval, excerpts from the decision seem appropri-
ate: The Fourth Circuit opinion, in part, said:
If, in determining the tolling effect of the pendency of the action in the
federal courts of Kentucky, we were required, as we are in determining the
applicable period of limitation, to follow the state law of Virginia, it is possi-
ble, although not certain, that we would uphold the time-bar.
435 F.2d at 529.
. ..Allowing Atkins to litigate the merits of his claim at this time
would be consistent with the basic purpose reflected in the tolling rule-
saving the right of action for plaintiffs who, without fault, have been un-
able to obtain an adjudication on the merits.
Id. at 530.
... By its nature this issue never has been and never will be re-
solved, or even considered by any court of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Given the differences between the two judicial systems, no one can say with
any assurance what Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals would do if con-
fronted with the question now before us in the context in which it arises.
1974]
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resubmission, filed concurring opinions based on the belief that under
Virginia law the suit was not time barred.220
It should be remembered there are circumstances where a borrow-
ing statute of the forum is inoperative and hence does not call into op-
eration a loci tolling provision. These include situations where the
limitation statute of the forum has itself barred the suit227 and where
the event is pleaded as a pure defense in a pending suit and the limita-
tion statute is wholly inapplicable.228  However, in a diversity suit for
personal injuries and property damage suffered on May 30, 1970,
commenced on May 14, 1971, to which the defendant on June 9, 1971
filed a counterclaim for his personal injuries and property damage,
a federal district court in Tennessee held:
The counterclaim herein of June 9, 1971 was obviously in-
terposed more than one year after the cause of action arose on
May 30, 1970. The commencement of this original action did
On an issue so closely procedural and so intimately involved in the na-
ture and functioning of the federal judicial system, we believe that service of
the integrity and needs of that institution should prevail over random guesses
about essentially irrelevant state law stemming from different institutional
considerations.
Id. at 531.
Though here there was no transfer of the action in the Western District
of Kentucky and the question of its transferability was not raised, the
commencement of this action in the Western District of Virginia during the
pendency of the Kentucky action has achieved the same practical result.
A determination of the tolling effect of the commencement and prosecution
of the federal action in the Western District of Kentucky ought to be had
under the same body of law regardless of the procedural means by which
prosecution of the substantive cause of action is discontinued in the district
court sitting in Kentucky and continued in a district court sitting in Virginia.
Id. at 537-38.
. . . Since every purpose of Virginia's proscription against the commence-
ment of tort actions more than two years after the injury has been served,
we conclude that, as a matter of federal law, the statute has been satisfied.
Id. at 538.
226. Id. at 539.
227. Conner v. Spencer, 304 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1962).
mhe statute of limitations of the forum provides an ultimate limita-
tion upon the period within which suit may be brought in its courts, even
though by operation of a tolling statute the period of limitations on the cause
of action has not yet expired in the jurisdiction in which it accrued ....
Id. at 487.
228. United States v. Western P.R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
.. . To use the statute of limitations to cut off the consideration of a
particular defense in the case is quite foreign to the policy of preventing
the commencement of stale litigation. We think it would be incongruous to
hold that once a lawsuit is properly before the court, decision must be made
without consideration of all the issues in the case and without the benefit of
all the applicable law. If this litigation is not stale, then no issue in it can
be deemed stale.
Id. at 72; cited as controlling in Heck v. Rodgers, 457 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1972).
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not toll the applicable statute of limitation for purposes of inter-
posing a counterclaim .... Accordingly, the counterclaim hereby
is dismissed .... 229
The Tennessee rule here applied seems unduly harsh once the accident
was made the subject of litigation by a suit brought in time.
A ground frequently asserted as tolling a limitation statute is fraud-
ulent concealment of the cause of action by the defendant. Proof of
affirmative misrepresentation is normally required. Where a federal
statute of limitations is applicable, the federal fraudulent concealment
rule, that time does not begin to run until the plaintiff has or should
have had knowledge of the facts, controls. 23 0  This also applies where
a federal statute by silence brings into play the state statute of limita-
tions. 23 '
Diversity cases apply the state rule regarding the effect of fraudu-
lent concealment.232
Where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties, the
rule requiring affirmative misrepresentation may be relaxed. In Hood
229. Maxwell v. Roark, 337 F. Supp. 506, 507 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
230. Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918); Atlantic City Electric
Co. v. General Electric Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
909 (1963). The plaintiff has the burden of proving non-discovery. Laundry Equip.
Sales Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
231. Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961). "We
hold that the federal rule as to the effect of concealment on the running of a period
of limitation applies to an action for treble damages under the Clayton Act even when
a state statute is used to measure the period . . . ." Id. at 83; cf. Knuth v. Erie-Craw-
ford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 463 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1972).
232. In a representative case where an assertion of tolling by fraud was rejected,
the court said:
• . . The argument is based upon plaintiff's contention that defendant
fraudulently represented to plaintiff that the press base was low stressed
though defendant knew it was high stressed, that defendant repeated the
same misrepresentation to plaintiff in conjunction with its subsequent sale to
plaintiff of another press, and that defendant failed to inform plaintiff of
information available to it concerning plaintiff's cause of action.
Accepting those allegations as true, they simply do not invoke the pro-
visions of Section 23 [of the Illinois Act] . . . . [Ilt is clear that no af-
firmative act or representation of defendant was inclined to prevent plaintiff
from ascertaining the true facts.
Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 351 F. Supp. 329, 337-39 (S.D. Ill. 1972). Section
23 of the Illinois Act provides:
If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of action
from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be com-
menced at any time within five years after the person entitled to bring the
same discovers that he has such cause of action, and not afterwards.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 23 (1971).
Where the time when alleged fraud was discovered or should have been discovered
becomes a factual issue it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment. Benjamin v.
Western Boat Building Corp., 475 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1973); cf. Wail v. Flack, 15
N.C. App. 747, 749, 190 S.E.2d 671, 672 (1972).
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v. McConemy,233 plaintiffs, residents of Pennsylvania, in late 1969 filed
diversity suits for legal malpractice in a Delaware federal court against
a Pennsylvania and a Delaware attorney. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had improperly dismissed a medical malpractice suit in Del-
aware in which they represented the plaintiffs and then concealed the
dismissal. The proceedings were consolidated, and the defendants as-
serted the Delaware three year statute of limitations. In denying a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the court held:
. . . Although no Delaware cases have faced the issue, nu-
merous state courts do not require an affirmative act where the
wrongdoer maintains a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff.
[T]he court is of the opinion that Wilson's alleged failure to
notify the Hoods or McConemy could be sufficient to constitute a
fraudulent concealment.234
9. ACCRUAL AND TERMINATION OF LIMITATION PERIOD
A tenuous line, if any, separates events that toll, and events that
cause the accrual of, a period of limitation.23 5  The two areas could be
233. 53 F.R.D. 435, 445-47 (D. Del. 1971).
234. Id. at 445. The North Carolina rule regarding the tolling effect of fraud
is stated in Calhoun v. Calhoun, 18 N.C. App. 429, 197 S.E.2d 83 (1973):
[N.C.] G.S. § 1-52 provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud
or mistake must be brought within three years after "the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." The Su-
preme Court of our State has held in numerous cases that in an action
grounded on fraud, the statute of limitations begins to run from the discovery
of the fraud or from the time it should have been discovered in the exercise
of reasonable diligence.
Id. at 432, 197 S.E.2d at 85; cf. Hendrickson v. Sears, 359 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass.
1973). In a diversity legal malpractice action, it was held, that for purposes of the
Massachusetts statute of limitations, the federal district court was required to follow
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that the limitation period
commenced when the malpractice occurred. The Federal Court did not have an option
to apply the "discovery rule." Accordingly, a suit brought in 1971 for alleged malprac-
tice in connection with a title search made in 1961 was barred, whether considered
to be in tort or contract.
235. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the various forum rules as
to when different causes of action accrue, where no conflicts problem is involved.
Thus the interesting question of when a breach of warranty action accrues has been
herein discussed in multi-state borrowing (see text accompanying notes 68-85 supra and
the analysis of Parrish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 46 Mich. App. 85, 207 N.W.2d 422
(1973) in text accompanying notes 201-05 supra), and tolling situations, but will not
be given separate treatment. There are numerous collections of local law rules which
govern as to when actions accrue in a single state setting. See, e.g., Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d
821 (1965); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1151 (1964); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961); An.
not., 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1086
(1931); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1317 (1931).
A 1971 change in the North Carolina statute of limitations regarding accrual mer-
its notice. It provides:
(a) Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed
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lumped together, but perhaps clarity is enhanced by an effort to differ-
entiate them. The emphasis in this section is on the following three
problems: (1) what events cause a right of action to accrue; (2)
under what circumstances are amended pleadings said to "relate
back;" and (3) what events amount to initiation of suit within the
statutory period. At times the distinction does become significant in a
conflicts setting.
in this Chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except where in spe-
cial cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute.
(b) Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action,
other than one for wrongful death, having as an essential element bodily in-
jury to the person or a defect in or damage to property which originated
under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent
to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the
time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have
been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such
cases the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the claim for relief.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (Supp. 1973). The language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b),
while somewhat obscure, appears to apply not only to personal injuries resulting from
breach of warranty, but also to property damage so arising. So construed, it substan-
tially changes the North Carolina law.
The previous North Carolina rule regaiding accrual of a breach of warranty action
is set out in Employers Commercial Union Co. of America v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 15 N.C. App. 406, 190 S.E.2d 364 (1972). The court said:
The courts of this state have consistently held that the statute of limita-
tions for claims for injury or damage from a defective product begins to run
from the date of the sale and delivery of the product (not the date of the
ultimate failure of the product or the injury). . . . G.S. 1-15(b) was en-
acted after this cause of action arose and it has no application to'this case.
Id. at 410, 190 S.E.2d at 367; accord, Hall v. Gurley Milling Co., 347 F. Supp. 13
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (mem.).
Stell v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F. Supp. 17 (W.D.N.C. 1969) was a
diversity suit by a truck driver to recover for injuries received in an accident in North
Carolina, allegedly resulting from sale of a defective tire by the defendant to plaintiff's
employer (apparently in Virginia). The suit was filed more than three years after
the sale of the tire but less than three years after the accident. In denying a motion
for summary judgment contending the action was time barred, the court held:
The North Carolina statute by its terms begins to run after the action
has "accrued." The suit does not involve an "injury" to the person or rights
of another until the plaintiff was hurt. There was no "injury" and no basis
for action until the wreck occurred in North Carolina on July 26, 1965.
New Dixie might have had an action for breach of contract when the tire
was delivered, [place of delivery was not revealed] but plaintiff, the driver
had no cause of action until he was injured.
Since the cause of action, if any, arose or "accrued" to Stell in Nozth
Carolina, rather than in Virginia, the two-year Virginia statute of limita-
tions does not apply.
Id. at 18-19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Supp. 1973) appears to put a ten year limi-
tation from the time of sale on a factual situation such as that presented in Stell;
see discussion of Parrish v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 46 Mich. App. 85, 207 N.W.2d 422
(1973), in text accompanying notes 201-05 supra; cf. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Weeks-Allen Motor Co., 18 N.C. App. 689, 198 S.E.2d 88 (1973), which held that
a claim for indemnity does not arise until the injured party brings an action against
the one seeking indemnity; accord, Hager v. Brewer Equip. Co., 17 N.C. App. 489,
195 S.E.2d 54 (1973).
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A. When Cause Of Action Accrues.
When a cause of action accrues may be determined by statute
or by judicial decision. Normally, the matter is determined by the law
of the forum. However, the forum court may apply the law of the
state where the cause of action accrues.2 a8 Association for the Pres-
ervation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon,23 7 a diversity libel suit, is
an example of the use of a statute to determine when a cause of action
accrues. The New York federal district court applied the New York
single publication statute and held that the subsequent out-of-state
publications of an alleged libel, as well as the original publication in
New York, were barred by the New York one year statute.238
236. E.g., Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1966).
This was a third party negligence action in a federal court in Georgia, by one Lock-
miller and an insurance company to recover for personal injuries received in an acci-
dent in Texas in January 1959, for which Texas workmen's compensation had been
previously awarded. Defendant Baron asserted the Georgia two year statute of limita-
tion had run when suit was filed against him in March 1964. The court held the
suit was brought in time, and said:
The applicable Georgia statute of limitation is two years and the period
begins running when the cause of action accrues ...
To determine when the cause of action accrued we must look to Texas
law. . . . Under Texas law the cause of action accrued when judgment was
entered on Lockmiller's Texas workmen's compensation claim, December 11,
1962. . . . The present suit was instituted on March 19, 1964, within the
two year Georgia statute of limitations, and hence is not barred.
Id. at 860.
237. 299 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
238. In affirming, the court of appeals said:
. . . The alleged libelous statements were first published in New York.
Judge Murphy held this claim to be time barred, by virtue of the one-year
period of limitations provided in New York Civil Practice Act, § 51, which
is measured from the time of first publication. . . . Were New York forced
to recognize as a separate claim for relief each subsequent publication in
another jurisdiction, the policy of its Statute of Limitations and single pub-
lication rule "to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims"' . . . would
be swept away. We are not here concerned with a tort which arose full-
born in a sister state ...
[A] Federal District Court sitting in . . . diversity, should comply
with'tis state rule for the state rule is bound up with rights and obligations
of the parties and its application does not disrupt the procedures of the
federal system. Otherwise, the outcome would likely depend on the court-
house where suit is brought.
299 F.2d at 214-15.
An interesting California case applying its Uniform Single Publication Act one
year statute of limitations is Belli v. Roberts Bros. Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 49
Cal. Rptr. 625 (1966). Suit was filed against the furrier for alleged defamatory state-
ments. The court held:
Here the statements alleged to be an invasion of privacy appeared in
various editions of the San Francisco Chronicle on February 13, 1962, al-
though the newspaper bore the date February 14, 1962. Appellants' alleged
causes of action arose therefore on February 13, 1962 when various editions
containing the article to which they object were distributed to the public.
The statute of limitations began to run against appellants when the first gen-
eral distribution of the first edition of the Chronicle was made on February
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Fowler v. A. & A. Co. 289 involved a suit filed February 18, 1966
in the District of Columbia against a contractor for breach of a contract,
accompanied by a guarantee, to waterproof a basement in Maryland.
Defendant asserted the action was barred by the Maryland statute of
limitations which he contended started to run from the date the base-
ment wetness recurred-June 1962. The court rejected this conten-
tion, holding the breach of contract action began to run under District
of Columbia law from the date defendant breached the contract by
failing to correct the defect on demand.-June 10, 1963, and that the
suit was brought in time under the applicable District of Columbia stat-
ute.24
0
B. Relation Back Of Amended Pleadings.
A recurring problem is whether, in an action filed before the limi-
tation statute has run, the filing of amended pleadings after that time
"relates back" so as not to be time barred. This article will not concern
itself with the many domestic procedural law problems arising under
diverse state "relation back" statutes and rules. Within a given state
these are subject to frequent legislative reformulation. In conflicts sit-
uations the forum court usually applies its own rule to this problem,
but may, if it chooses, look to the relation back law of another jurisdic-
tion with a relationship to the asserted cause(s) of action. Here, only
sparse examples of multi-jurisdictional relation back situations are pre-
sented.
In federal question cases in the federal court, this issue is clearly
controlled by federal law. Hence, in an action under the Federal
Torts Claim Act, a mother, who had originally appeared as next
friend for her minor son for his injuries by an army explosive device,
was permitted nearly five years after the accident to amend the com-
plaint to include her claim as a parent for loss of services of the mi-
nor.241 The court said:
". .. The Federal rule on the 'relation back' of amendments
to pleadings, as embodied in Federal Rule 15(c), is permissive.
As long as the amended complaint refers to the same transaction
or occurrence that formed the basis for the original complaint and
13th .... [It necessarily follows that appellants' complaint, filed Febru-
ary 14, 1963, was too late and the statute of limitations has barred their
claims.
Id. at -, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
239. 262 A.2d 344 (D.C. App. 1970).
240. Id. at 347.
241. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1968).
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the defendant was put on notice of the claim by the first com-
plaint, there will be no bar to amendment; even new defendants
and new theories of recovery will be allowed. '242
It is not yet crystal clear that Federal Rule 15(c) applies in di-
versity cases in the federal courts, to the exclusion of the relation back
rule of the state in which the federal court sits. A guarded dictum in a
federal district court case assumes that Federal Rule 15(c) is controll-
ing, 243 and a recent Seventh Circuit decision clearly held the rule to
apply.244
242. Id. at 236-37, citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 338 F.2d 229, 234 (5th
Cir. 1964); accord, Aluminum Co. of America v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Il. 1972). Here the court upheld a suit for refund
of overcharges paid by a shipper brought under the Interstate Commerce Act, holding:
"[P]laintiff's claims for enforcement of the Commission order relate back to the time
it filed its complaints and are not barred by the statute of limitations." Id. at 684.
See also Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 346 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
243. Hockett v. American Airlines, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. II. 1973). The
court said in denying defendant's motion to dismiss:
In this case the Second Amended Complaint filed March 2, 1973, named
Janet Hockett as a new plaintiff. No new defendants were added. Her
claim for loss of consortium against the defendants, contained in Counts IV,
V, and VI, are based upon the same allegations of negligence as are Curtis
Hockett's. The factual matrix for Janet Hockett's claims is identical to that
of her husband's. The defendants cannot claim prejudice in this case since
they have been fully advised of the facts upon which Curtis Hockett has
based his claim and have been vigorously preparing their defenses. Accord-
ingly, Janet Hockett's claims relate back under Rule 15(c) to the date of
the original pleading. As that pleading was filed within the appropriate
limitation period, the claims of Janet Hockett set forth in the Second
Amended Complaint, are not subject to the bar of the statute of limitations,
even if one were to assume that the two-year period applied.
Id. at 1348. This is dictum because the opinion had previously determined that under
Illinois law a five year, and not the two year statute of limitations applied.
FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c) in part provides: "These rules apply to civil actions re-
moved to the United States district courts from the state courts and govern procedure
after removal." However, no express reference is made to diversity cases, and the
Rules are not helpful in resolving the "outcome determinative" quandary as to whether
state or federal law should be applied to this specific situation. The trend of many
states to adopt the essence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as their own rules
of civil procedure may tend to moot this question.
In diversity, in a wrongful death suit, again by dictum, since the case was decided
on the ground of sovereign immunity, a federal district court disposed of the question
of the relation back of an amended pleading. In Nickell v. Westervelt, 354 F. Supp.
III (W.D. Va. 1973), the court ruled:
. . . The court must answer the question whether dismissal of the action
by this court terminated the action so that an amended complaint, when
filed, would be time-barred. The court holds that when the judgment of dis-
missal was vacated by the Fourth Circuit and the case was remanded to this
court, granting leave to amend, it was a continuation of the original action,
and the limitations period would be measured from the date the right of ac-
tion accrued to the time of the filing of the original complaint and not to
the date of the filing of the amended complaint. Therefore, the action did
accrue within the two year limitations period stated in the wrongful death
statute, Section 8-634 of the Code of Virginia.
Id. at 114.
244. Simmons v, Fenton, 480 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1973). The court clearly held
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Yet another facet of Rule 15(c) was presented in a civil rights
suit brought by a prisoner convicted of killing two police officers while
he was engaged in an armed robbery. 245 The plaintiff alleged viola-
tions of his civil rights under section 1983 asserting that a police of-
ficer "caused him to be convicted by illegal means in lying and inflam-
ing the public about [him]. ' 246  Since section 1983 cases have no ap-
plicable federal limitations statute, the court applied the then analogous
six year statute of New York, the state in which the federal action
was brought.2 47  The events in issue occurred May 22, 1962. Plaintiff
filed suit on April 15, 1968. On December 1, 1969 he sought to amend
his complaint to allege a cause of action for assault, asserting this
might be done under Federal Rule 15(c) and so would be in time.
The court held the alleged action for assault was time barred under
Rule 15 (c).248
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to be determinative of the relation back effect
of an amended complaint in a diversity tort action. There the complaint was filed
in a federal district court in Illinois one day before the two year statute ran but was
not served until three weeks later, and then upon the twelve year old daughter of the
driver of the car who had mistakenly been named as the defendant. Thereafter plain-
tiff sought to amend to name the mother, who had been the driver, as the defendant.
In affirming the district court denial of plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the circuit
court said:
We are presented with a novel question concerning the amendment of a
complaint in a diversity tort action and the date to which it may or may not
relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[S]tate statutes of limitation are frequently geared to the filing of the
complaint. This appears to be so in Illinois. However, Rule 15(c) is geared
to notice. The party to be substituted must receive notice of the action
"within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him".
. Doris J. Fenton had no notice until after the statute of limitations had
run. She could not have had notice that a suit had been filed against her
until she heard about it.
Since . . .the requirement had not been met that the defendant sought
to be substituted-by amendment must have notice of the filing of the action
prior to the running of the statute of limitations, plaintiff cannot prevail.
Id. at 134, 137.
245. Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1973).
246. Id. at 522.
247. See text accompanying notes 74-93 supra.
248. If the test were merely temporal, the assault claim would fall within
Rule 15(c), since the alleged assault came within a short time after the ex-
hibition before the television cameras. However, the test is not contempo-
raneity but rather adequacy of notice. As said by Judge Larimore in Sno-
qualmie Tribe v. United States, 372 F.2d 951, 960, 178 Ct. Cl. 570 (1967),
"the inquiry in a determination of whether a claim should relate back will
focus on the notice given by the general fact situation set forth in the
original pleading." Under that test the case for relation back conspicuously
fails. On the most liberal reading not a word in the complaint even sug-
gested a claim of physical assault. ...
Since the assault claim must be deemed not to have been asserted until
December 1, 1969, it was time-barred unless the six year statute of limita-
tions had been tolled. New York's tolling provision in behalf of certain
prisoners affords Rosenberg no aid [since] ... limited to persons who-
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In a case arising out of an accident in Ontario, where all parties
were residents of Michigan and where suit was brought in Michigan
within the Michigan three year statute but not within the Ontario one
year statute, the court refused to permit amendment of an answer to
plead the Ontario statute.2"9 It held:
[I]n an action between litigants all of whom are domiciliaries
of Michigan, timely brought but for the provisions of [the Uniform
Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act], a failure to plead
the bar of a foreign statute of limitations in the first responsive
pleading is not amendable. 250
C. What Constitutes The Institution Of Suit For Limitation Purposes.
There remains for consideration in this section the problems as to
when a suit is commenced for purposes of determining whether it was
brought within the limitation period.
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads: "A civil ac-
tion is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Where a
federally created right is the subject of suit, it has been held that the lan-
guage of Rule 3 controls and that when a complaint is filed with the
clerk of court this act alone tolls the running of a federal statute of limi-
tations. A typical case so holding is Moore Co. v. Sid Richardson Car-
bon & Gas Co.,251 an action based on alleged violations of the Robin-
son-Patman Act and the Clayton Act for which a four year federal stat-
ute of limitations is prescribed.252
The federal rule also applies to a cause of action based on a fed-
eral statute even though the right sought to be enforced is given by
are imprisoned "on a criminal charge or conviction for a term less than
life."
Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1973); accord, White v. Padgett,
475 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1973), which affirmed dismissal of a civil rights violation suit
brought by a plaintiff who had been confined to a mental institution, saying: "In Flor-
ida the only limitation statute suspended or tolled by insanity or other disability is
that applicable to the recovery of real property." Id. at 83.
249. Wilson v. Eubanks, 36 Mich. App. 287, 193 N.W.2d 353 (1972).
250. Id. at -- 193 N.W.2d at 356.
251. 347 F.2d 921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925 (1965). In reversing
a district court judgment dismissing the complaint, the court opined:
No reasonable basis exists for engrafting upon the rule or statute a
condition that summons be served with diligence. If Congress or the rule-
makers had intended to impose such condition, it would have been a simple
matter to include the condition by appropriate language in the rule or the stat-
ute. As heretofore pointed out, the Rules Committee deliberately chose not
to impose any such condition.
Id. at 925; see Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1963).
252. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
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state law.253
For limitation purposes, pinpointing the time when a diversity
case is commenced raises a difficult federal question, which yet awaits
final resolution by the Supreme Court. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co.,254 where plaintiff sued in diversity in federal court
in Kansas for highway accident injuries, his complaint was filed less
than two years after the event, but summons was not served until after
two years had expired. Kansas law provided that the statute was
not tolled until service of summons. The district and appeals courts
dismissed the action, applying the Kansas law. The Supreme Court
affirmed:
[I]n the present case we look to local law to find the cause of
action on which suit is brought. Since that cause of action is cre-
ated by local law, the measure of it is to be found only in local
law. It carries the same burden and is subject to the same de-
fenses in the federal court as in the state court. . . . Where local
law qualifies or abridges it, the federal court must follow suit.
Otherwise there is a different measure of the cause of action in
one court than in the other, and the principle of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins is transgressed.255
The holding in Ragan might conceivably have settled the prob-
lem, but in 1965, in Hanna v. Plumer,250 another personal injury di-
versity suit presenting the issue as to when suit is commenced, the Su-
preme Court held the federal rules prevailed, saying:
The question to be decided is whether, in a civil action where
the jurisdiction of the United States district court is based upon
253. Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1956). Plaintiff sued under section
43 of the Civil Rights Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)) for alleged false
arrest and false imprisonment under color of law in violation of his constitutional
rights. Plaintiff filed a complaint and a petition to sue in forma pauperis in less than
two years after the event, but before the petition was approved more than two years
had elapsed. In reversing a district court order granting summary judgment for de-
fendants on the ground the suit was time barred, the court held:
Civil Rights Act, § 43 . . . so far as it is pertinent, provides: "Every
person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects ... any citizen ... to
te deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... "
-The right sought to be enforced however, is a creation of the state and the
period during which the right may be enforced is governed by the limitation
put upon it by the state .... The two-year limitation of the Michigan
statute would, therefore, bar the suit, if it had not been begun in time.
235 F.2d at 155.
In determining that the time had not expired the court relied upon Isaacks v. Jef-
fers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1944); see Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1964); Annot.,
90 A.L.R.2d 265 (1964).
254. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
255. Id. at 533.
256. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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diversity of citizenship between the parties, service of process shall
be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set forth
in Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[T]he District Court granted respondent's motion for sum-
mary judgment citing Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co.. . . and
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. . .in support of its conclusion that
the adequacy of service was to be measured by § 9 (Massachu-
setts law), with which, the court held, petitioner had not complied.
* * , The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, finding that
"[r]elatively recent amendments to § 9 evince a clear legislative
purpose to require personal notification within one year," con-
cluded that the conflict of state and federal rules was over "a sub-
stantive rather than a procedural matter," and unanimously af-
firmed . . . . Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of
federal procedure posed by the decision below, we granted cer-
tiorari ....
We conclude that the adoption of Rule 4(d)(1), designed to
control service of process in diversity actions, [neither exceeded
... the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling
Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule] is
[therefore] the standard against which the District Court should
have measured the adequacy of the service ....
To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to
function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created
rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of
power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that
power in the Enabling Act. Rule 4(d)(1) is valid and controls
the instant case.257
In Hanna Chief Justice Warren relegated consideration of Ragan to
a "See" citation in a footnote to the textual statement, "Petitioner, in
choosing her forum [in Hanna] was not presented with a situation
")258where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery ... .
This treatment of the problem has, not surprisingly, produced con-
flicting decisions in the circuit courts of appeal which the Supreme Court
has not yet resolved. The Eighth,2 9 and Sixth,28 0 and Fifth201 Circuits
257. Id. at 461-64, 473-74.
258. Id. at 469. Other manifold diversity problems raised by Hanna are here ig-
nored.
259. Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966). The court, in a diver-
sity accident case where the complaint was filed in less than the two years prescribed
by the Iowa statute, but the summons was not placed in the hands of the United States
marshal until one day after two years, affirmed a dismissal for time bar, saying:
It is the contention of the plaintiff-appellant that the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Hanna v. Plumer . . . overrules Ragan .... The
court there held that in a civil action in a federal court, where jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship, service of process shall be made in the
manner set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(d)(1),
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follow Ragan. The Second 2 and Tenth26 3 Circuits follow Hanna.
The academic-legal considerations involved have been ably explored
in two American Bar Association Journal articles.264 At least one
recognized federal jurisdiction authority has referred to Hanna as "an
opinion that appears to overrule Ragan.265  While speculation as to
rather than in the manner prescribed by state law. While citing and referring
to Ragan the court very carefully avoids overruling its holdings .... The
instant case appears to us to be directly governed by Ragan .... While it
is difficult to reconcile Hanna v. Plumer . . .until the Supreme Court itself
overrules its very positive statements in Ragan, the lower courts must follow
its holdings.
Id. at 642; accord, Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, 480 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1973);
Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967), citing Groninger v. Davison,
supra, as conclusive.
260. Sylvester v. Messier, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965).
261. Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), held that
the federal rule of relation back of amended pleadings did not bar the running of a
one year Louisiana limitation on personal injury suits. The court stated: "We think
Ragan, then, controls this case. Conceding as we do, that it has its critics, it remains
viable." Id. at 842; cf. Alford v. Whitsel, 52 F.R.D. 327, 331 (D. Miss. 1971); see
discussion of relation back in text accompanying notes 241-50 supra.
262. Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968). The court
held:
Judge Wyatt, in ruling on [defendant] Comad's motion for judgment on
the pleadings, held that Ragan ...which he felt, if still good law, would
require application of [New York] CPLR § 203, had been overruled by
Hanna ... so that Rule 3, Fed. R. Civ. P., was applicable .... We agree
with Judge Wyatt that in view of Hanna v. Plumer ... the federal rule as
to the time of commencement of action governs.
Id. at 604.
263. Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971). The court said:
[W]e conclude as follows: (1) Ragan does not govern the instant case
because under the law of Kansas as it presently exists the statute concerning
the time an action is deemed to be commenced (K.S.A. 60-203) is purely
procedural in nature and is not an integral part of the applicable Kansas
statute of limitations (K.S.A. 60-501 and 513(4) ); (2) Hanna does con-
trol to the end that Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 takes precedence over K.S.A. 60-203;
(3) and under federal rule the actions having been commenced within two
years after the causes of action accrued, the trial court did not err in deny-
ing defendant's motions for summary judgment.
Id. at 450.
264. Siegel, The Federal Rules in Diversity Cases: Erie Implemented, Not Re-
tarded, 54 A.B.A.J. 172 (1954). That author concludes:
Erie will continue to spawn troublesome children. However long a re-
spite she may need after Hanna, her fertility is not impaired. These mis-
chievious [sic] children will romp until Congress abolishes diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, a course urged for a long time by the late Justice
Felix Frankfurter and many commentators on the federal courts.
Id. at 176; see Zabin, The Federal Rules in Diversity Cases: Erie in Retreat, 53
A.B.A.J. 266 (1967), in which the author asserts:
The practical and salutary effect of Hanna is to give the practitioner
the assurance that he will be safe if he follows the Federal Rules and Judicial
Code when they apply, for it is hard to envision any of the Federal Rules
as invalid under the broad standard of Hanna. Hanna removes Erie as a
relevant guide in the determination of the validity of any of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 269.
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future Supreme Court action is always hazardous, this author inclines
to the view that Hanna will ultimately prevail over Ragan. In an epoch
in which many states are adopting the federal rules as their own, and in
view of the basic philosophy of the federal rules that they shall provide
uniform civil procedure for all litigation in the federal courts, and con-
sidering the desirability of a rule that will provide reasonably certain
guidance to diversity litigants and their lawyers, it is perhaps permissible
to hope that narrow exceptions such as Ragan may wither away. How-
ever, until the Supreme Court definitely proclaims such withering,
plaintiff's counsel in diversity should, where possible, scrupulously
comply with both state and federal rules in the initiation of the litigation.
A federal district court in North Carolina has adhered to Ragan.
In Rios v. Drennan266 plaintiff filed a wrongful death diversity com-
plaint five days before the North Carolina statute had run, but because
of a failure to post the required bond, summons was not issued until
over a month later. The court held that the then North Carolina prac-
tice as to when the action was commenced, that is, upon the issuance
of summons, governed, and the action was dismissed as time barred.
Thereafter, the North Carolina General Statutes Commission, believ-
ing that the variance between the federal and state rule should be
eliminated, 8 7 proposed, and the North Carolina Legislature adopted,
Rule 3,268 which essentially conforms to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules
265. 1 J. MOORE, A. VEsTAL, P. KORLAND, MoORE's MANUAL, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4.06, at 174 (rev. 1973). It is also there stated that, "It has now
been definitely settled . . . that wherever there is a conflict between the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and state law, the former is to control."
C. WRir & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1057, at 189(1969) assert: "It is certainly difficult to reconcile the reasoning in Hanna with that
in Ragan; and it is worthy of note that in his concurring decision in Hanna, Justice
Harlan expressed concern over the Court's failure to deal sufficiently with Ragan and
stated that in his view the Ragan decision 'was wrong'...." However, these authors
continue:
There is some substance to the distinction offered in Hanna, particu-
larly in the notion that Rule 3 does not deal with the particular problem
raised in Ragan. By way of contrast, Rule 4(d)(1) directly covers the
situation presented in Hanna. Rule 3 simply provides that an action is com-
menced by filing the complaint and has as its primary purpose the measuring
of time periods that begin running from the date of commencement; the
rule does not state that filing tolls the statute of limitations. Thus, Ragan
and similar cases may still be read as holding that Rule 3 does not determine
or measure the point at which certain state-created rights are extinguished and
that this conclusion is unaffected by Hanna.
Id. at 190-91.
266. 209 F. Supp. 927 (E.D.N.C. 1962).
267. See N.C.R. Cv. P. 3, Official Comment.
268. N.C.R. Cv. P. 3, effective July 1, 1970, provides:
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of Civil Procedure. In this manner, except where the statute alternative
is involved, the North Carolina Legislature has mooted the question of
the ultimate dominance of Ragan or Hanna.
The preceding cases all involved only a conflict between the fed-
eral rule and that of the state in which the federal diversity court pre-
sided. In a suit for damages resulting from an accident in Kentucky
brought in a United States district court in Ohio, the Ohio borrowing stat-
ute brought into play the Kentucky one year statute of limitations.2 69
The complaint was filed within one year, but the summons was not
issued until after one year had passed. Ohio law provided suit was not
commenced until summons was issued, but this provision was not an
integral part of the Ohio statute of limitations. It was here held that the
question was procedural, that Federal Rule 3 applied, and the action
was not barred by the Ohio rule. Thus, by applying Hanna, no inter-
play of Ohio-Kentucky limitations was reached.
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The
clerk shall enter the date of filing on the original complaint, and such entry
shall be prima facie evidence of the date of filing.
A civil action may also be commenced by the issuance of a summons
when
(1) A person makes application to the court stating the nature and
purpose of his action and requesting permission to file his complaint
within 20 days and
(2) The court makes an order stating the nature and purpose of the
action and granting the requested permission.
The second paragraph of the preceding Rule, is in essence, the first part of former
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-121 (1953), designed to take care of emergencies in which there
is no time to prepare a complaint. Regarding these alternative provisions, cf. Lattimore
v. Powell, 15 N.C. App. 522, 190 S.E.2d 288 (1972); Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.
v. Teamsters Local 61, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461 (1971).
The flexible possibilities now available under North Carolina Rules 3 and 4 are
demonstrated in Sink v. Easter, 19 N.C. App. 151, 198 S.E.2d 43 (1973). The appel-
late court reversed a trial court order granting a motion for summary judgment based
on a contention that the action was time barred. The appellate court held the action
was brought in time under the following set of facts:
The accident. . . occurred on 6 September 1968. Summons was issued
on 4 September 1971. On the same day, plaintiff made application to the
court for an extension of time within which to file his complaint. The ap-
plication stated the nature and purpose of the action. The court extended
the time within which plaintiff could file his complaint to 24 September 1971
and ordered that a copy of the application and order be delivered to the de-
fendant with a copy of the summons. On 10 September 1971 the sheriff re-
turned the summons and order extending time to file complaint unserved,
with the following notation: "Kenneth Wesley Easter not to be found in
Guilford County-in Amsterdam address unknown." The complaint was filed
on 23 September 1971. Notice of service by publication was published on 1,
8 and 15 October 1971. The notice complied with Rule 4(j)(9)c. On 11
November defendant filed a motion to dismiss, saying that he had not been
served with process and that the court lacked jurisdiction.
Id. at 152-53, 198 S.E.2d at 43-44.
269. Mahan v. Ohio Auto Rentals Co., 207 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
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The question of when a suit is commenced may, of course, arise in
a multi-state setting in a state court without federal diversity jurisdic-
tion being involved. Ginise v. Zaharias270 was such a case. There a
California resident sued in California for injuries sustained in Connecti-
cut. The California borrowing statute made the Connecticut statute of
limitations applicable. The complaint was filed within the time limita-
tion prescribed by Connecticut, but summons was not issued until after
it had expired. California law provided that filing of the complaint
commences the suit; Connecticut law provided that suit is not com-
menced until the summons is issued. The California court held that
since the Connecticut commencement rule was not a part of the Connec-
ticut statute of limitations, the California borrowing statute did not em-
brace it, that this procedural question would be governed by the forum
law of California and that the action was not time barred.
New York has held its commencement rule is procedural and
has applied it both where it borrowed the period of limitations from
another state,27 1 and as to a federal statute of limitations with respect to
a federally created cause of action.272
Finally, the previous filing of an action in a court without jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter does not interrupt the running of the statute of
limitations. 273
10. THE EFFECT OF A LONG ARM STATUTE ON TOLLING
Normally, statutes of limitations are tolled during the time a non-
resident defendant is not within the borders of the forum state. This
is ostensibly because a defendant should not be able to take advantage
of a state's statute of limitations when he has placed himself out of per-
sonal reach of the state's service of process. However, long arm
statutes in many circumstances permit states to obtain in person-
am jurisdiction over a defendant beyond its borders. Therefore the
majority rule is that the running of a statute of limitations is not
tolled during the time that in personam jurisdiction may be obtained
by substituted service on a nonresident defendant. The minority rule is
that during the absence of a defendant from the state, tolling occurs
even though he is subject to in personam jurisdiction under a long arm
270. 224 Cal. App. 2d 153, 36 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1964).
271. Drummy v. Oxman, 280 App. Div. 800, 801, 113 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (1952).
272. Irons v. Michigan-Atlantic Corp., 279 App. Div. 32, 108 N.Y.S.2d 824
(1952).
273. United States v. Continental Cas. Co., 354 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1972).
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statute.17 4  The problem frequently arises in the context of whether a
borrowing statute of the forum is, or is not, applicable, where under
loci law the absent defendant has been subject to in personam jurisdic-
tion by service of substituted process. The forum applies the domestic
law of the locus to determine whether, under that limitation and toll-
ing statute, the action is fully barred so as to make applicable the bor-
rowing statute of the forum. The following cases illustrate the prob-
lem and its resolution:
Daigle v. Leavitt 75 was an action brought by four Connecticut
residents, both adults and minors, for injuries sustained in an accident
in Massachusetts, against the defendant driver, a New York resident.
Applicable statutes of limitations were, respectively, Massachusetts two
274. At least nineteen states have followed the majority rule and six the minority
rule. Daigle v. Leavitt, 54 Misc. 2d 651, 283 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (1967). The Appen-
dix to the case collects the authorities. It reads:
The following cases hold that the law of the jurisdiction listed is that
tolling statutes do not apply when a nonresident defendant may be served by
substituted service. Alabama: Peters v. Tuell Dairy Co., 250 Ala. 600,
35 So. 2d 344; Karagiannis v. Shaffer, D.C., 96 F. Supp. 211. California:
Kroll v. Nevada Industrial Corp., 65 Nev. 174, 191 P.2d 889. Connecticut:
Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 166 A. 70; Tublitz v. Hirschfeld, 2 Cir.,
118 F.2d 29; Colello v. Sundquist, D.C., 137 F. Supp. 649; Sage v. Hawley,
16 Conn. 106. Delaware: Hurwitch v. Adams, 52 Del. 13, 151 A.2d 286
aff'd 52 Del. 247, 155 A.2d 591. Illinois: Nelson v. Richardson, 295 Ill.
App. 504, 15 N.E.2d 17; Hale v. Morgan Packing Co., D.C. 91 F. Supp. 11.
Iowa: Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d 711; Carpenter v.
Kraft, 254 Iowa 719, 119 N.W.2d 277; Burkhardt v. Bates, D.C., 191 F.
Supp. 149. Kansas: Bond v. Golden, 10 Cir., 273 F.2d 265. Michigan:
Hammel v. Bettison, 362 Mich. 396, 107 N.W.2d 887. Missouri: Haver v.
Bassett, Mo. App., 287 S.W.2d 342; Scorza v. Deatherage, 8 Cir., 208 F.2d
660; Garth v. Robards, 20 Mo. 523. Nevada: Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. Oliver,
78 Nev. 479, 375 P.2d 857. New Hampshire: Bolduc v. Richards, 101
N.H. 303, 142 A.2d 156; Hatch v. Hooper, 101 N.H. 214, 138 A.2d 671.
New York, Fuller v. Stuart, 3 Misc. 2d 456, 457, 153 N.Y.S.2d 188.
Oklahoma: Moore v. Dunham, 10 Cir., 240 F.2d 198; St. Louis & S.F.R.
Co. v. Taliaferro, 67 Okl. 37, 168 P. 788. Oregon: Whittington v. Davis,
221 Or. 209, 350 P.2d 913. South Dakota: Busby v. Shafer, 75 S.D. 428,
66 N.W.2d 910. Tennessee: Arroweed v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562,
121 S.W.2d 566, 119 A.L.R. 855; Young v. Hicks, 8 Cir., 250 F.2d 80.
Utah: Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915. Vermont: Reed
v. Rosenfield, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d 189. Washington: Smith v. Forty Mil-
lion, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 912, 395 P.2d 201.
The remaining cases listed below hold that the jurisdictions affected toll
the statute of limitations as to non residents even though substituted service
is available. Idaho: Staten v. Weiss, 78 Idaho 616, 308 P.2d 1021. New
Jersey: Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20, N.J. Misc. 119, 25 A.2d 430; Lemke v.
Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 196 A.2d 523; Blackmon v. Govern, D.C., 138 F.
Supp. 884. Ohio: Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139;
Chamberlain v. Lowe, 6 Cir., 252 F.2d 563. South Carolina: Macri v. Fla-
herty, D.C., 115 F. Supp. 739. Texas: Cellura v. Cellura, 24 A.D.2d 59,
263 N.Y.S.2d 843. Wisconsin:. Bode v. Flynn,-213 Wis. 509, 252 N.W. 284,
94 A.L.R. 480.
Accord, McClendon & Co. v. Hernando Phosphate Co., 100 Ga. 219, 224, 28 S.E.
152, 153 (1897).
275. 54 Misc. 2d 651, 283 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1967).
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years, New York three. Suit was brought in the New York state court
more than two, but less than three, years after the accident occurred.
A Massachusetts long arm statute provided for substituted service upon
nonresident motorist defendants. Whether this statute prevented ap-
plication of the general Massachusetts tolling provision when defendants
are absent from the state had not been determined by the Massachu-
setts courts. However, a federal district court in Massachusetts had
determined that Massachusetts would follow the majority view that,
under these circumstances, the tolling provision would be inappli-
cable.2 76 The New York court dismissed as to the adult plaintiffs, hold-
ing their action barred. Both Massachusetts and New York allowed mi-
nors to bring suit after reaching majority. Accordingly, their claims
were not barred.
Mangene v. Diamond,2 77 a diversity suit based on a California
automobile accident and filed in a federal district court in Pennsyl-
vania, was dismissed as time barred under the following circum-
stances:
Our sole concern is whether at the time of the accident...
appellee was a non-resident motorist of California within the
meaning of the California Motor Vehicle Code ...
...During the full year of the running of the one year
California statute of limitations appellee was available for service
of process. For the first three months he was still in the Marines
and could have been personally served in California irrespective
of whether he was a resident or nonresident. Thereafter he was
available by the statutory mail method of service. Since this ac-
tion was commenced after the California statute had expired it is
prohibited by the applicable Pennsylvania Borrowing Act ...
which provides that "When a cause of action has been fully barred
by the laws of the state or country in which it arose, such bar
shall be a complete defense to an action thereon brought in any
of the courts of this commonwealth." 278
Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co.,2 79 held that a diver-
sity action for libel, filed in Illinois against a Minnesota corporation by an
Illinois corporation, was barred by the Illinois statute of limitations
where the Minnesota corporation held a certificate of authority to trans-
act business in Illinois and had a registered agent for service of process
in Illinois during the entire period following the alleged publication.
276. Smith v. Pasqualetto, 146 F. Supp. 680 (D. Mats. 1956).
277. 229 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1956).
278. Id. at 555-56.
279. 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
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Before the appellate court, plaintiff argued that the libel was initiated
Minnesota and did not arise out of any transaction of business be-
tween plaintiff and defendant in Illinois. The court held that this ob-
jection to personal jurisdiction was not presented in the trial court and
was therefore waived.
An interesting application of the minority rule is contained in
Ohio Brass Co. v. Allied Products Corp.2s0  Suit was in federal court in
Ohio for breach of warranty as to steel pins delivered by the defendant
nonresident corporation to plaintiff in Ohio in August, 1962. During
all of this time under an Ohio statute in personam jurisdiction could
have been acquired over the defendant by substituted service. How-
ever, defendant had not appointed an agent for service in Ohio until
January, 1968. Suit was filed December 11, 1969. The applicable
statute of limitations was four years. In denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the court held the Ohio tolling statute was appli-
cable and the action was not time barred. It said, "[tihe literal lan-
guage of the Ohio 'savings clause' tolling provision is tied to the tolling
of acts which prevent personal service in Ohio rather than to acts which
would prevent any judgment in personam. ' 281
Subtle questions concerning who has the burden of proof in estab-
lishing whether process could or could not be served sometimes arise.
For example, in Marterie v. Dorado Beach Hotel,282 a diversity suit was
brought in Puerto Rico for personal injuries inflicted on plaintiff by
defendant Champagne, an employee of the defendant hotel. Cham-
pagne was a nonresident of Puerto Rico and left shortly after the oc-
currence. Long after the one year limitation period had expired, plain-
tiff amended his complaint to join Champagne as a defendant and
280. 339 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Ohio 1972). In further explanation of its decision
the court said:
The ... conclusion to be drawn from the decisions of the Ohio Su-
preme Court ...is that a foreign corporation upon which personal service
in Ohio could not be had is absent from the state within the meaning of
O.R.C. § 2305.15, and that the statute of limitations does not run against
such corporation until such time as it-is subject to personal service in Ohio,
regardless of the fact that an Ohio court could have acquired in persOnamjurisdiction over such corporation by virtue of substituted service. The
Court recognizes that such rule is contrary to the rule applied by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals . . . . While a District Court is generally bound
to adhere to rulings of a Court of Appeals, in a diversity action where the
highest state court has subsequently interpreted state law in a manner incon-
sistent with the interpretation of the federal court it is the ruling of the state
court which must be followed.
Id. at 424.
281. Id.
282. 330 F. Supp. 860 (D.P.R. 1971).
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served him by registered mail in Louisiana. The court refused to dis-
miss, stating:
[T]he facts of this case make it wholly unnecessary for this
Court to now take a stand on the interpretation of Puerto Rico's
tolling statute, a matter which has not been passed upon by the
Commonwealth courts . . . . [Champagne] has failed to show
that substituted service of process could be effectively had upon
him during the period of his absence.
.. . Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations was tolled
and the action against co-defendant Champagne stands.288
A contrary result on the burden of proof was reached in Hill v.
Schantz, 284 an action in New York for damages resulting from a colli-
sion in New Jersey at a time when both parties were residents of New
Jersey. The court recognized the New Jersey rule that its statute of lim-
itations was tolled by respondent's removal from New Jersey before the
expiration of the two-year period of limitation, notwithstanding the
New Jersey statute permitting service of process upon the Director of
Motor Vehicles. However, the court held that since the statute had
been raised by the defendant in his answer, the plaintiff had failed to
meet his burden to prove by clear and decisive proof that the defend-
ant had removed from New Jersey before the two year statute of limita-
tions had run. Accordingly, a motion to strike the answer was prop-
erly denied.
North Carolina has looked both ways in determining the effect of a
long arm statute upon its tolling statute. In 1905 in Green v. Hart-
ford Life Insurance Co.,2 5 the North Carolina Supreme Court clearly
stated and followed the minority rule that such a statute did not impede
the operation of the tolling statute against nonresidents. However, Green
was expressly overruled five years later in Volivar v. Richmond Cedar
Works,8 6 and the majority rule was applied to hold that the tolling
283. Id. at 862-63.
284. 10 App. Div. 628, 196 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1960).
285. 139 N.C. 309, 51 S.E. 887 (1905).
286. 152 N.C. 626, 627, 68 S.E. 200, 200-01 (1910). The court held:
The overwhelming weight of judicial precedent recognizes the doctrine as
expounded by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Wall v. R.R., 69 Ia., 501: "The
theory of the statute of limitations is that it operates to bar all actions except
as against persons and corporations upon whom notice of the action cannot be
served because of their nonresidence. If such notice be served and a personaljudgment obtained which can be enforced in the mode provided by law
against the property of such person or corporation, wherever found, then such
person or corporation is not a nonresident as contemplated by the statute of
limitations."
;'Th'e'rule, briefly stated, is that if under the laws of ihe domestic State
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statute was inoperative. The rule announced in Volivar was strongly
reaffirmed in 1934 in Smith v. Finance Co. of America.2 87  All three
of these cases dealt with a foreign corporation defendant which had
either appointed an agent for service in North Carolina or, having failed
to do so, was subject to service by the leaving of process with the Sec-
retary of State.
There is unfortunate language in a 1936 case, Hill v. Lind-
say,21 where the question was whether the statute of limitations was
tolled as to a nonresident individual defendant. The opinion of the
court states:
Being a nonresident of the state, he may not be permitted to
invoke the protection of the statute of limitations, even though he
may spend some time each year in the state.
Nor could this rule be affected by the fact that he .. .had
an agent in this State.289
When this case was decided in 1936, North Carolina had no bor-
rowing statute, and its long arm statute applied only to corporations,
not individuals. In the light of the broad scope of the present North
Carolina long arm statute,290 adopted in 1967, which expressly applies
both to corporate and natural persons, Hill probably would not now be
applicable in a long arm statute situation.
It remains to be seen whether the majority rule will continue to
prevail as to all aspects of the innumerable state long arm statutes that
have proliferated since the green light was flashed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in International Shoe Co. v. Washington291
and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,292 in 1945 and 1957
respectively. The logic and reasoning of the majority rule as devel-
oped for nonresident motorist and corporate defendants, would appear
the corporation has placed itself in such position that it may be served with
process, it may avail itself of the statute of limitations when sued. Ability
to obtain service of process is the test of the running of the statute of
limitations."
In Express Co. v. Ware, 87 U.S. 543, the Supreme Court of the United
States held: "A statute of limitations as against a foreign corporation begins
to run from the time such corporation has a person within the State upon
whom process to commence a suit may be served."
287. 207 N.C. 367, 369, 177 S.E. 183, 184 (1934).
288. 210 N.C. 694, 188 S.E. 406 (1936).
289. Id. at 696, 188 S.E. at 407.
290. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1969). For a comprehensive discussion of this
statute see Louis, Modern Statutory Approaches to Service of Process Outside the
State-Comparing the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure with the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act, 49 N.C.L. Rav. 236 (1971).
291. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
292. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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to be equally applicable to all defendants, both corporate and indi-
vidual, who come within the in personam reach of long arm statutes
that comply with the minimum requirements of due process.103
11. MAY "SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP" OR "INTEREST ANALYSIS"
TESTS DETERMINE THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS?
In approaching the complex question as to whether significant re-
lationship or interest analysis tests should have any place in determining
the statute of limitations to be applied to a given action, it should be re-
membered that, by definition, a statute of limitations is a legislative
act. Except in the limited area of the doctrine of laches, the function
of a court in resolving a limitations issue is to apply and interpret the
legislative mandate, not to fashion separate judicial tests. State statutes
providing limitation periods, tolling, borrowing and other related de-
tails, afford a typical example of the exercise of the legislative preroga-
tive to prescribe conflict of law rules by statutory enactment. To
the extent the legislature explicitly performs this function, the judiciary
would normally be precluded from innovative deviations in applying
statutes of limitations. However, in the past fifteen years the trend of
judicial interest in engaging in significant relationship and interest and
policy analysis has resulted in nearly half of the states adopting by
judicial decision the analytical choice of law approach as their conflict
of laws rule.294 As might be expected, this technique has in a few
cases seeped through to the resolution of statute of limitations ques-
tions. To these instances we now turn our attention.
The cases seem to fall into two categories. First, those where the
forum court is proceeding without the benefit of a borrowing statute
and is ignoring that fact. Second, diversity cases in which federal courts
are manfully, but warily, seeking to comply with the Erie and Stentor
mandates in doing what they surmise the supreme court of the state
in which they sit would do, if it happens to be a "significant relations"
or "policy analysis" jurisdiction, so far as its conflicts law is concerned.
In some instances the federal courts have not hesitated to say that
such conflict formulations have no application to multi-state statute of
limitations problems.
An example of this last approach was exhibited by the district
293. For a North Carolina oriented discussion of widening concepts of jurisdiction
over the person see Wurfel, supra note 109, at 25-29.
294. See Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 243,
250-64 (1970), and authorities cited therein.
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court in Chartener v. Kice295 Where it differentiated choice of law and
limitation problems. There, in a diversity survival action predicated
on illness and ultimately death in California, resulting from medical
malpractice in New York, the court stated:
The plaintiff's survival action, viewed as the continuation of
a cause of action, is governed by the statute of limitations gener-
ally applicable to malpractice actions. It is well settled that, for
choice of law purposes, such statutes are characterized as proce-
dural, and that reference must be made to the law of the fo-
rum . . While the New York courts have led the nation in the
adoption of more flexible choice of law rules, they have not applied
the [interest analysis] rationale to every area, and there is little in
the cases which would support a deviation from the traditional rule.
The Court is faced with the issue of whether the running of the
statute was tolled by the alleged intervening insanity of the de-
cedent. Since that issue involves contested factual issues, the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the survival action must be denied.296
A jurisdiction adhering to the first approach stated above is the
District of Columbia, which does not have a borrowing provision in its
statute of limitations but has seized upon "interest analysis" as a
means of achieving a borrowing provision result.297  In a personal in-
jury diversity action brought by a California citizen residing in Virginia
against a New York corporation doing business in both Virginia
and the District of Columbia for an injury in Virginia, a federal district
court sitting in the District of Columbia applied the Virginia two
year statute, and not the three year District of Columbia statute and
held the suit time barred though brought within less than three years.
The court opined:
In the District of Columbia conflict of laws problems are gov-
erned by the state "interest analysis" approach in which the rela-
tionship of each jurisdiction to the controversy is determined and
the interest of each in the application of its own rule of law is eval-
uated . . . particularly in the area of tort law, this approach has
been extended to such issues as the limitation on damages in
wrongful death actions... and intra-family tort immunity ....
295. 270 F. Supp. 432, 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). Other aspects of this case are con-
sidered in the text accompanying notes 178-79 supra.
296. 270 F. Supp. at 439. In a 1971 diversity case a federal district court in Illi-
nois expressed a preference for the traditional rule that a borrowing statute applies
to the limitation of the state in which the last act occurred establishing the tort, rather
than any significant relationship test, but pointed out the result in the case at bar would
be the same under either test. Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,
334 F. Supp. 890, 894 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
297. Farrier v. May Dep't Stores Co., 357 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1973).
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There is no reason why the lex fori rule ... should not similarly
be superseded by the interest analysis doctrine in tort cases where
there are conflicts between statutes of limitations.
The purpose of both the Virginia and District of Columbia
statutes of limitations is to protect domiciliaries from the prosecu-
tion of stale claims. This purpose would be served in this case
only by an application of the Virginia statute. The District of
Columbia has no relation to the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, and
no person or property in the District of Columbia has been
adversely affected by the alleged act of negligence which occurred
in Virginia .... 298
This result seems to fly in the face of the ostensibly deliberate
omission of a borrowing provision by Congress from the District of Co-
lumbia limitation statute.
Substantially the same result predicated on substantially the same
reasoning as that of the previous case was reached by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Heavner v. Uniroyal Inc.29 9 Here one plaintiff
had purchased a defective tire in North Carolina that caused a North
Carolina accident in which one plaintiff suffered personal injuries and
property damage, and the other, loss of consortium. Both plaintiffs
were residents of North Carolina, and the foreign corporation defend-
ants, respectively retailer and manufacturer of the tire, were both
subject to personal service in North Carolina where the then appli-
cable statute of limitations was three years. Suit was brought in New
Jersey, where defendant Uniroyal was incorporated, more than three,
298. Id. at 191.
299. 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). In affirming lower court judgments for
defendants, the court declared:
New Jersey has never had such a statute [borrowing]. But as Professor
Sedler points out: "The absence of a borrowing statute should not prevent
application of the statute of the locus; for a policy against forum shopping
can be set out by the judiciary as well as the legislature." [citing Sedler, The
Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict
of Lmvs, 37 N.Y.U.L. REy. 813, 850 (1962).]
We are convinced the time has come to discard the mechanical rule that
the limitations law of this state must be employed in every suit on a foreign
cause of action. We need go no further now than to say that when the
cause of action arises in another state, the parties are all present in and
amenable to the jurisdiction of that state, New Jersey has no substantial in-
terest in the matter, the substantive law of the foreign state is to be applied,
and its limitation period has expired at the time suit is commenced here,
New Jersey will hold the suit barred. In essence, we will "borrow" the limi-
tations law of the foreign state. We presently restrict our conclusion to the
factual pattern identical with or akin to that in the case before us, for there
may well be situations involving significant interests of this state where it
would be inequitable or unjust to apply the concept we here espouse.
Id. at -, 305 A.2d at 418; cf. Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1257
(D.N.H. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1970) (without mention of this precise
point).
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but less than four years after both the sale and the accident. New
Jersey has no borrowing statute. Under these circumstances the New
Jersey court held it would judicially "borrow" the North Carolina stat-
ute, thus barring the action, since New Jersey had no substantial inter-
est in the matter.
An example of the second category of cases mentioned above is
Horton v. Jessie300 in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the applicability of the "significant contacts" analysis in a
diversity statute of limitations setting, but in its per curiam opinion
affirmed the California District Court's conclusion that "[u]nder the
California significant contacts approach, we find too little Missouri
significant contacts and too many in California to apply the Missouri
statute. '30
1
In Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air
Brake Co82 the Third Circuit rejected the "contacts" approach to
a limitation problem in a suit brought in Pennsylvania to recover in-
demnity for having paid a Florida judgment predicated on injury re-
sulting from a defective brake assembly. The court applied the time bar
of the Florida statute holding:
The cause of action arose when Mack satisfied the judgment,
an event evidenced by formal entry of record in Florida court on
June 30, 1960.
Perhaps it would be arguable, on the merits of the present
controversy, that in determining the existence or extent of an ob-
ligation to indemnify, the forum should be guided. . . by the sub-
stantive law of Pennsylvania because of cumulatively significant
Pennsylvania "contacts". But we do not have that problem here.
We have to answer only the narrow question of the meaning of
the phrase "where the cause of action arose", as used in the
Pennsylvania borrowing statute and applied to a situation in which
the action came into existence upon the happening of certain events
in Florida.30 3
A dissenting opinion would have upheld the action, applying the
longer Pennsylvania limitation because Pennsylvania was the jurisdic-
tion of primary interest.304
300. 423 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1970).
301. Id.
302. 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1966). Other facets of this case are considered in the
text accompanying notes 168-71 supra.
303. 372 F.2d at 20-21.
304. The dissent, in part, stated:
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In a diversity suit by Minnesota plaintiffs against fllinois and Colo-
rado defendants for injuries resulting from an Iowa automobile accident,
a federal district court in Iowa refused to apply "significant relationships"
to select the statute of limitations.80 5 The court stated that although
Iowa had adopted, at least in part, the significant relationship rule as
far as application of substantive tort law was concerned, the Iowa con-
flicts rule calls for the application of its own limitation.
[T]he Iowa statute of limitations is dispositive of the issues
herein presented. Plaintiffs' cause of action for negligence, having
been brought in this Court more than two years after the alleged
injuries were sustained, is barred by the Iowa two-year statute of
limitations .... 306
A federal district court in New York has refused to follow the
"significant relationship 307 test in applying the New York borrowing
statute in diversity.308 Plaintiff and plaintiff's decedent, citizens of
British Columbia, sued the defendant manufacturer for damages re-
sulting from the crash in Alberta of an aircraft manufactured in
Pennsylvania. The applicable British Columbia and Pennsylvania lim-
itation was one year, and that of both Alberta and New York two
years. In holding the diversity suit filed more than one year after
the accident not barred, the court declared:
The New York Court of Appeals has not yet had occasion to
consider whether the Babcock rule applies to problems involving
the borrowing statute of limitations . . . . Prediction must be
made almost without basis in New York precedent.
Pennsylvania is in the forefront of jurisdictions which have recently
adopted a pragmatic standard of choice of law which eschews mechanical
formulas. This standard reduces the possibility of manipulation to insig-
nificance....
Pennsylvania's interest in the period of limitations to be applied in this
action far outweighs the interest of Florida. Florida's real interest was in
the negligence action for the accident which occurred in Florida. That ac-
tion, in which Florida's interest dominated, terminated in a judgment, which
was satisfied by payment. The present action for indemnity, on the other
hand, is dominated by Pennsylvania's interest ....
Id. at 23.
305. Conradi v. Boone, 316 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
306. Id. at 919-21.
307. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963) is the celebrated case in which New York definitively abandoned the traditional
lex loci rule in tort cases and adopted an interest analysis approach as its conflict
of law rule. Thus, in a one car accident which occurred in Ontario in the course
of a brief trip by New York residents, recovery was allowed to a guest plaintiff against
a host driver for injuries resulting from his negligent driving. The New York court
applied the substantive guest tort law of New York and rejected that of Ontario wch
barred such recovery.
308. Nielson v. Avco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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. . . There is little reason to believe that the Legislature,
when it spoke of a cause of action "accruing", meant anything
other than that it "accrued" in the familiar terminology "where
the last act necessary to establish liability occurred".
Accordingly, I prophesy, and as a Federal District Court sit-
ting in New York, hold that under the New York borrowing statute
the cause of action for wrongful death accrued in Alberta where
the injuries causing death occurred. Cf. Chartner v. Kice. Under
the two-year Alberta statute of limitations, that cause of action is
not time barred. 30 9
A most peculiar feat of interest analysis calesthenics was per-
formed by a federal district court in Pennsylvania in the case of
Gross v. McDonald.310 This was a simple negligence damage suit
brought in Pennsylvania by a plaintiff guest against a host defendant
driver resulting from an accident in Indiana and in the face of an In-
diana guest statute prohibiting such actions. At the time of the acci-
dent both plaintiff and defendant were temporary residents of Ken-
tucky, and the trip started from and was intended to terminate in Ken-
tucky. The district court, following the Pennsylvania conflicts rule of
policy and interest analysis, determined that the substantive tort law of
Kentucky rather than Indiana was applicable and that the simple negli-
gence suit was maintainable. The action was brought more than one,
but less than two years, after the accident occurred. Applicable stat-
utes of limitations were one year in Kentucky, and in both Indiana and
Pennsylvania two years. The court held that under the Pennsylvania
conflicts rule (interest analysis), its borrowing statute would look to
Indiana and not Kentucky, and since the action was not barred in In-
diana, the Pennsylvania borrowing statute would be inapplicable, mak-
ing the two year Pennsylvania limitation controlling. Thus the court
of a "disinterested" forum held the substantive law of Indiana insignifi-
cant and inapplicable but at the same time looked to Indiana lex loci
as most "significant" in determining the effect of the Pennsylvania bor-
309. Id. at 80-81; cf. O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1113 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), which states:
[Flor purposes of applying the New York borrowing statute the plaintiffs'
causes of action accrued in Washington as a result of the crash in Maine.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit predicted in George v. Douglas
Aircraft Co. [332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964)]
that for borrowing statute purposes New York would hold that the cause
of action "arose" in the state of manufacture, sale and delivery and compare
that state's statute of limitations. So far as this court is aware, the New
York Court of Appeals has not yet specifically affirmed the prediction.
310. 354 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
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rowing statute.3 11 This ingenious dichotomy of reasoning richly re-
warded resourceful forum shopping.
The final current case is that of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc.,31 2 enunciated by the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin. This case demonstrates that after the convulsive process of inter-
est analysis has been resorted to a court may finally reach the same
result which is clearly indicated by the statute so analyzed. Here plain-
tiff Air Products, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business and offices in Pennsylvania, in 1964 sent purchase orders,
which were accepted, for a number of large electric motors, to an agent
of the defendant Delaware corporation, in Pennsylvania. Defendant,
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., manufactured the motors in Wisconsin, and
they were delivered to plaintiff at installation sites in Louisiana, Dela-
ware and New Jersey. Six of the motors failed to perform, damaging
plaintiff Air Products. Plaintiff Hartford, a Connecticut corporation, in-
demnified Air Products for part of its loss. Plaintiff Air Products
commenced the suit against defendant in Wisconsin on May 8, 1969,
and plaintiff Hartford sued on December 1, 1970. Both plaintiffs al-
leged negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and breach
of contract. Defendant asserted the Pennsylvania four year statute of
limitations as a defense. The applicable Wisconsin statute of limitations
is six years. All parties agreed that all issues other than the statute of
limitations must be resolved under Pennsylvania law. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the trial court that the Wis-
consin six year statute applied but restated the reason therefor. It
said:
The trial court concluded that each state must determine for
itself the period of time in which a suit for a particular claim
can be brought; and that the 'center of gravity' approach to con-
311. The court reasoned as follows:
[W]e have decided not that Kentucky law governs this lawsuit, but
rather simply that Pennsylvania choice of law principles dictate that the In-
diana guest statute not be applied in this case. Similarly, Pennsylvania choice
of law principles govern the choice of a statute of limitations.
In the case before us, the automobile accident and the immediately re-
sulting injuries occurred in Indiana, so that the borrowing statute would
here refer to Indiana, not Kentucky, law.
Secondly, the ever-resourceful defendant argues that this action is "fully
barred" under the Indiana law because of Indiana's guest statute; plaintiff
did not, and could not, allege wanton or wilful negligence. The borrowing
statute, however, which is entitled "Limitation of action in foreign state a bar
here," provides for observance of the other states' statutes of limitations, not
of other defenses ....
Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
312. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
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flicts questions which was originally adopted by this court .. .
is too unpredictable to be used when the fundamental question of
the appropriate statute of limitations is in issue. We agree with
the trial court's ruling on the statute of limitations issue. How-
ever, we think the choice of law is a matter to be decided on the
basis of the existing conflicts rules of this court.
There can be no question but that the underlying purpose in
the enactment of a statute of limitations is to protect defendants
and the courts from ". . . stale claims springing up at great dis-
tances of time and surprising the parties . . ." when all the evi-
dence, once vivid, has since become obscure ...
A determination that Wisconsin's six-year statute controls
would in no way affect any legitimate interest of Pennsylvania
since their statute, like ours, is designed to protect defendants and
in this case, Air Products, the Pennsylvania resident is the plain-
tiff-not the defendant. Likewise, Pennsylvania is in no position
to in any way influence what Wisconsin feels to be an appropri-
ate period of protection for both itself and defendants from stale
lawsuits.31 3
The Wisconsin borrowing statute applied only to a nonresident
plaintiff receiving personal injuries outside Wisconsin, not to prop-
erty damage suits3 14 and so was inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Ignoring this circumstance, at least so far as the opinion is con-
cerned, the court applied the Wisconsin statute, normal procedure in
the absence of a borrowing statute.
Unremarkably, the half, or more, of the states that have either ex-
pressly rejected, or have not converted to, significant relationship or pol-
icy analysis as their norm in conflicts matters have not opened this
pandora's box. So long as North Carolina continues its practice of
consistent adherence to lex loci as its conflicts rule, as re-examined and
enunciated in Shaw v. Lee,315 it is improbable that its courts will under-
take to resolve statute of limitations conflict problems by any means
other than the application of the pertinent North Carolina legislative
pronouncements.
12. LIMITATION BY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION
There remains for consideration the situation where limitations by
contractual provision conflict with the statute of limitations require-
ments of the forum. The substantive rule is that a jurisdiction may per-
313. Id. at-, 206 N.W.2d at 418-19 (emphasis added).
314. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.205 (1966).
315. 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
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mit, reject, or limit domestic contractual efforts to prescribe a period in
which suit must be brought other than that contained in its own statute
of limitations. Such domestic rule, legislative, judicial, or a combina-
tion of the two, is an expression of the policy of the jurisdiction. The
constitutional powers of a state to control contractual limitations upon
suit contained in domestic contracts have not been seriously ques-
tioned.31 6
Where the contractual limitation before the court is contained in a
contract executed in a state other than that of the forum, it was long be-
lieved that federal constitutional inhibitions came into play. This has
now been shown not to be the case, and it appears clear a forum court
may reject a contractual time limitation in a contract made in another
jurisdiction if that limitation is violative of the limitation public policy
of the forum, and the forum has a reasonable relationship to the trans-
action. The problem usually arises from insurance policy clauses, but
is not limited to that area.
For example, in Sauer v. Law, Union & Rock Insurance Co.,317
the insured sued on a fire policy which contained a provision that
"[no] suit .. . on this policy . . . shall be sustainable . . . unless
commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss.13 18
Action was commenced one year and seven months after the fire. In
granting summary judgment for the defendant, the District Court for
Alaska said:
It is well established that a contractual limitation in insurance
policies requiring suit to be brought within a prescribed period
of time is, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary,
valid, if reasonable. Consequently, an action brought after the
expiration of such time would be barred. The fact that the period
thus fixed is shorter than the general statute does not invalidate
.he policy requirement.310
An example of holding that policy of the forum, as enunciated by
its own laws, may override personally agreed limitations entered into in
other states, so long as the forum has a real interest in the transaction is
found in an Arizona case. 2 0 Here the defendant, a physician, had bor-
316. Sanders v. American Cas. Co., 269 Cal. App. 2d 306, 74 Cal. Rptr. 634
(1969); Insurance Co. of North America v. Carnahan, 446 Pa. 48, 284 A.2d 728
(1971); Stewart v. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., 187 Pa. Super. 270, 144 A.2d
504 (1958).
317. 17 F.R.D. 430 (D. Alas. 1954).
318. Id. at 431.
319. Id.
320. Ross v. Ross, 96 Ariz. 249, 393 P.2d 933 (1964). The court also held:
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rowed money from his father over a period of time, giving in return a
series of twelve notes, each containing a provision waiving "diligence
in bringing suit against any party hereto. ' 32 1 All the notes were drawn
and payable in Iowa. None were paid and when the father died the
notes were distributed in the estate to the plaintiff, another son. De-
fendant, who had lived in Arizona for more than the Arizona period of
of limitation, refused to pay. An order granting dismissal for time bar
was affirmed. The court stated:
We approve the general rule . . . [that] "[m]atters bearing
upon the execution, the interpretation and the validity of a con-
tract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is
made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by
the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respect-
ing the remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissibility of evi-
dence, statutes of limitation, depend upon the law of the place
where the suit is brought"....
We have before held that the statutes of limitation of this
state are declarations of public policy as well as a private right
of the individual. Public policy cannot be wiped out by a private
attempt to repeal the statutes in advance. The waiver of "dili-
gence in bringing suit" was ineffective.3 22
There are other cases in which the forum court has invalidated
contractual limitations on grounds of public policy. In Oil & Gas Ven-
tures - First 1958 Fund, Ltd. v. Kung,3 23 a federal district court in New
York, sitting in diversity, held inapplicable, under the facts presented,
contractual agreements entered into in Texas, requiring "that all claims
for discrepancies disclosed by public audits be presented within two
years of the audit."'3 24
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has refused to apply the New
York six year statute of limitations to a suit on a'Nebraska guaranty
contract325 containing a provision that "[t[lhis guaranty shall be gov-
erned by and construed under the laws of the State of New York. '3 26 It
held that the contractual provision was void as against public policy
Appellant's plea that we'suspend the operation of limitation statutes as be-
tween father and son is a novel one .... We hold that parents dealing with
adult children do so under statutes of limitation applicable in like fashion as
to dealings between total strangers.
Id. at 252, 393 P.2d at 935.
321. Id. at 251, 393 P.2d at 934.
322. Id. at 251-52, 393 P.2d at 934.
323. 250 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
324. Id. at 753.
325. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Ryan, 171 Neb. 820, 108 N.W.2d 84 (1961).
326. Id. at 821-22, 108 N.W.2d at 86.
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and that the shorter Nebraska statute of limitations was applicable.
Similarly, a diversity federal court sitting in Missouri refused to enforce
a shortened limitation of time for suit by contract contained in an acci-
dent benefit certificate, issued by an Ohio fraternal benefit society to a
resident of Missouri, holding that Missouri courts would hold the provi-
sion to be against public policy. 27 The same court in 1965 had occa-
sion to reaffirm this Missouri position.328
In North Carolina since 1899, section 58-28 of the General Statutes
has provided: "All contracts of insurance on property, lives, or inter-
ests in this State shall be deemed to be made therein, and all contracts of
insurance the applications for which are taken within the State shall be
deemed to have been made within this State and are subject to the
laws thereof. '329  The 1919 case of Keesler v. Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Co.330 held that when the application is taken out of the state
and neither party was then a resident of North Carolina, the rule of
lex loci contractus applies and not section 58-28.
Similarly in Meyers v. Ocean Accident Guarantee Corp.,831 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a diversity case regarding an
automobile policy of liability insurance decided shortly after Erie became
law, held that the policy must be interpreted in accordance with Ohio
law since it had been delivered and became effective in Ohio, although
the accident occurred in Georgia. The suit was brought in a federal
district court in North Carolina by the insurance company against two
injured passengers, who were residents of North Carolina, to obtain a
declaratory decree of non-liability and to enjoin proceedings against the
insurer. The decision was apparently reached without reference to sec-
tion 58-28.
The constitutionality of section 58-28 was assumed in Wilson v.
Supreme Conclave,332 which held that the policy of a fraternal benefit
society organized in Maryland and issued to a resident of Charlotte was
subject exclusively to the law of North Carolina and not to Maryland
law regulating fraternal benefit societies there organized. However, in
the 1930's at least, it was generally believed that this result violated
327. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Meinsen, 131 F.2d 176
(8th Cir. 1942).
328. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 343 F.2d 670 (8th Cir.
1965).
329. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-28 (1965).
330. 177 N.C. 394, 99 S.E. 97 (1919).
331. 99 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1938).
332. 174 N.C. 628, 94 S.E. 443 (1917).
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due process of law in failing to recognize rights vested under a
valid contract and hence was constitutionally objectionable.383 This
view rested upon the United States Supreme Court cases of Home Insur-
ance Co. v. Dick,314 and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta
& Pine Land Co.335 These were later reinforced by Sovereign Camp v.
Bolin.316
This difficult constitutional issue was not resolved until the 1964
United States Supreme Court decision in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd.337 Clay held there was no due process or other constitutional imped-
iment to enforcing a Florida statute which nullified contractual limita-
tions on suit in insurance policies if they require suit to be filed in less
than five years after the policy claim arises. In Clay the assured, while a
resident of Illinois, purchased a policy covering loss or damage to per-
sonal property anywhere. Thereafter the assured became a resident of
Florida and there suffered personal property loss for which he filed a di-
versity suit more than twelve months after the loss. The policy contained
a twelve-month suit clause which was valid in Illinois. The insurer was
licensed to do business in Illinois, Florida, and other states. It seems
that under the Clay case, domicile of the insured by itself at the time of
the occurrence of the covered event, or the presence of the insured ob-
ject, may be enough to make applicable the local insurance law of the
forum, including the forum law regarding the validity of contractual
limitations upon the bringing of suit.
This result accords with the language of section 58-28 of the
North Carolina General Statutes. In the light of the Clay decision, the
Myers case might no longer be followed.
The insurance statutes of North Carolina recognize within limits,
the validity of contractual limitations in policies specifying the time
within which actions must be brought for enforcement of claims made
under insurance contracts. The general provision is contained in sec-
tion 58-31 of the General Statutes which, in part requires: "No com-
pany. . . may. . . in its insurance contracts. . . limit the time within
which . . .action may be commenced to less than one year after the
cause of action accrues or to less than six months from any time at
which a plaintiff takes a nonsuit to an action begun within the legal
333. The problem was ably stated in Note, Conflicts of Laws-Insurance-Validity
of Statutes Localizing Insurance Contracts, 3 N.C.L. REV. 213 (1934).
334. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
335. 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
336. 305 U.S. 66 (1938).
337. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
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time. All . . . stipulations forbidden by this section are void."3 8
Holly v. London Assurance Co.,3 39 held that the state statute of limita-
tions is inapplicable and that disabilities which stop the running of the
statute do not apply to such contractual time limitations on suit. On
the other hand, Dibbrell v. Georgia Home Insurance Co., 40 held that
such contractual limitations may be waived or that the insurer may be
estopped by his conduct from demanding their enforcement. Ideal
Brick Co. v. Gentry,241 required that such a contractual limitation must
be pleaded to be available as a defense.
Section 58-176 of the General Statutes, which applies to standard
fire insurance policies only, states: "No suit . . . on this policy . . .
shall be sustainable. . . unless commenced within twelve months next
after inception of the loss. ' '342 By a 1971 amendment this time was ex-
tended, as to policies thereafter issued, to three years. 43  This section
and the amendment thereto were inferentially approved in Gower v.
Aetna Insurance Co.144
The rules just stated regarding the validity of contractual limita-
tions are, of course, local North Carolina law. Their enforcement in a
conflicts setting as to out of state insurance contracts does not appear
to have been litigated in North Carolina. Under the United States Su-
preme Court decision Clay it would appear that North Carolina could
constitutionally refuse to enforce shorter contractual limitations in out of
state policies so long as the risk allegedly covered is reasonably related
to North Carolina.
The only Conflicts Restatement Second observation on this point is
to the effect that the validity of a contractual provision limiting the
time in which an action may be brought under the contract is deter-
mined by the law of any state related to the transaction chosen by the
parties or in the absence of such choice the law of the state with the
most significant relationship to the contract. 345 This approach would
leave North Carolina the same options it has under its lex loci contractus
rule in insurance policy cases. 40
338. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-31 (1965).
339. 170 N.C. 4, 86 S.E. 694 (1915).
340. 110 N.C. 193, 14 S.E. 783 (1892).
341. 191 N.C. 636, 132 S.E. 800 (1926).
342. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-176(c) (1965).
343. Ch. 476, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. Laws 403.
344. 281 N.C. 577, 189 S.E.2d 165 (1972).
345. REsTATEmTw (SEcoND) OF CoNFLicr oF IAws § 142 (1971). See also id.
at §§ 187-88.
346. The preceding nine paragraphs of text are primarily derived from Wurfel,
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Clay problems will continue to arise. For instance, the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, citing and relying on Clay in a diversity case, re-
versed the district court and held that a proceeding in New Mexico on an
insurance policy was not barred by a contractual limitation permis-
ible under California law.3 47 However, even in the Florida courts which
produced Clay, the supremacy clause has been applied in this area by
adhering to the one year limitation permitted by the Federal Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act,348 where applicable.' 49 Nevertheless, on occasion
federal courts have liberally construed such international maritime car-
riage contracts to sustain passenger damage suits otherwise barred.
Thus, in a suit brought more than one year after the event to recover
for injuries resulting from a lurch by the Italian Line's Steamship Leon-
ardo Da Vinci in mid-ocean, the action was permitted to proceed be-
cause the court deemed the small print reference to the contractual lim-
itation to be inadequate to bind the passenger.38 0
Multi-State Business Transactions: Contracts, in NORTH CAROLINA BAR AssoCATION
FOUNDATION, INsTITUTE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MULTI-STATE TRANSACTIONS V-
16, V-18, V-19 (1973).
347. Haury v. All-States Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1967). The court said:
[1in connection with policies providing uninsured motorists protection
California bars causes of action unless the insured formally institutes arbitra-
tion proceedings within one year from the date of the accident. The formal
demand of the insured for arbitration was made in California more than
one year after the accident.
The action and the arbitration are not barred by any New Mexico statute
of limitations. The questions are whether they can be maintained in New
Mexico, and if they can, whether the California limitation applies.
A state may impose its own rules on a foreign insuror if the state has
substantial contacts with the question being litigated. [Clay v. Sun Ins. Of-
fice, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-83 (1964).] The accident happened, and the
injuries were sustained, in New Mexico. The interest of New Mexico in
insurance protection for persons injured within its borders is a substantial
contact sufficient to sustain its jurisdiction.
In our opinion, the California statute does not bar either the action or
the arbitration proceedings in New Mexico.
Id. at 33-34 (citations added).
348. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
349. Coquette Originals, Inc. v. Canadian Gulf Line, 240 So. 2d 847 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970). In a per curiam opinion, a Florida district court of appeal held:
Under § 95'.11 (5) (c) Fla. Stat., F.S.A., the limitation period for actions
for damages to goods is three years. Under § 95.03 Fla. Stat., F.S.A., .con-
tractual provisions shortening statutory limitation periods are against public
policy and void. However, in actions controlled by maritime law contractual
shortening of a statute of limitation period is permissible as authorized by
[46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970)].
[D]efendant. . . acting as a shipper's agent. . . was entitled to the bene-
fit of the terms of the uniform bill of lading as provided for in the dock re-
ceipt, and to the one year contractual limitation period for filing suit.
Id. at 848.
350. Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 338 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1968). The opinion of Judge Friendly, in part, stated:
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13. CONCLUSION
One firm conclusion of the author is that any reader who has perse-
vered through this article will be most unlikely to overlook an opportu-
nity to plead the statute of limitations, or to fail to detect a way
around such a plea, whether in single-state or multi-state litigation.
Judge Metzner granted the motion [for summary judgment], apparently
for failure to begin the actions within one year, a contractual period of limi-
tation sanctioned by 46 U.S.C. § 183b(a).
If the company can establish that because of the (plaintiff) lawyer's
advice or otherwise Silvestri knew that the ticket required him to bring suit
within a year, we might have a different case. We hold only that it was
error to grant summary judgment for the respondent.
Id. at 13, 18.
